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INTRODUCTION
This article proposes a set of provisions that would encourage U.S.
companies and entities to invest in joint ventures with Israeli and Arab
partners in the Middle East. The immediate effect of these provisions
would be to revive and fortify the economies of that region. The long-
term objectives behind the enactment of such incentives would be
threefold: (1) to improve the prospects for peace and stability in the
Middle East; (2) to enhance the strategic and political standing of the
United States in the Middle East; and (3) to increase the long-term inter-
national competitiveness of U.S. businesses.
Four specific measures which could be pursued by the United States
to encourage U.S. companies to invest in Arab-Israeli joint 'ventures are
suggested in this article. First, the United States could grant tax incen-
tives to eligible U.S. entities (i.e., those that meet the necessary criteria
elaborated in Part II) that enter into qualifying joint ventures with Arab
and Israeli partners. The incentives could take the form of tax credits,
accelerated depreciation allowances, wage tax deduction allowances, or
preferential tax rates. The tax incentives would vary depending on the
"labor mix" or equity composition of the joint venture in question. The
most advantageous treatment would be accorded to joint ventures in
which each of the Arab, Israeli, and U.S. partners held one-third of the
enterprise's equity, and in which Arab and Israeli workers accounted for
equal shares of the labor pool.
Second, the United States could provide grants or loan guarantees to
companies that decide to invest in the aforementioned joint ventures.
This program could be administered by the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC), a government agency which already performs
similar functions. Approval of such guarantees could be subject to
review by a committee that would ensure that the investment conforms
with the best interests of the United States and promotes coexistence
between Arabs and Israelis.
Third, the United States could provide war risk, political risk, and
currency inconvertibility or currency volatility insurance at subsidized
rates to U.S. companies wishing to enter into Arab-Israeli-U.S. joint
ventures, but which have hesitated to enter into a seemingly profitable
venture due to fears of instability abroad. Similar political risk in-
surance, at market rates, is already offered by OPIC on an ad hoc basis.
As with loan guarantees, political risk insurance could be placed under
OPIC's auspices. In addition to the requirements set forth in the previ-
ous paragraph, grants of political risk insurance could be made contin-
gent on success of a business feasibility study, thus ensuring that risk is
managed and minimized by the government agency.
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Fourth, Congress could create an investment agency, a government
entity dedicated to assisting U.S. companies in overcoming bureaucratic
as well as cultural barriers. The investment agency would be lightly
staffed by specialists with experience trading in the Middle East. Its
services would range from dealing with government red tape to making
connections, alerting U.S. companies about opportunities abroad, and
providing guidance about national differences.
This article discusses all four of these measures. In Part I, the article
addresses the rationale for enacting U.S. legislation to encourage this
type of investment in the Middle East. It points out that due to recent
developments in the Middle East, now would be a very profitable time
for the United States to support joint ventures in the region, and it
discusses the role that the United States could play in the peace process.
In Part II, the mechanics of the proposed measures are examined. Four
types of incentives are discussed that could be used to encourage invest-
ment in the Middle East, and then problems common to all four of these
methods are addressed. Part III shows the way in which the new legisla-
tion could be enacted in the context of the current U.S. legislative
scheme. Part IV reviews current efforts by the United States to encour-
age economic development in the Middle East and points out how the
measures advanced in this article differ from these efforts. Finally, Part
V considers whether the current political climate in both the United
States and the Middle East favors the establishment of the investment
incentives proposed in this article.
I. THE RATIONALE: WHY ENACT SUCH LEGISLATION?
From a geo-strategic and military viewpoint, as well as from a
business and humanitarian perspective, the United States has an interest
in keeping the Middle East safe. The United States has sought to foster
regional stability in order to prevent nuclear proliferation, preserve free
access to natural resources, and promote democracy and human rights.
The United States has traditionally benefitted from a very close strategic
alliance with Israel. However, since its foundation in 1948, Israel has
been in a state of war or belligerency with most Arab countries. With
the exception of Egypt, Israel enjoys no diplomatic relations with any
Arab country. This has often caused friction in U.S.-Arab relations and
has harmed U.S. interests. The demise of the Soviet Union, however,
brought with it an opportunity for improved U.S. relations With Arab
countries without the United States having to compromise relations with
Israel. Strong alliances with some Arab governments have been forged
ever since the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, in which the United States
led an international coalition that included Arab forces.
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The United States has positioned itself at the forefront of efforts to
achieve peace among Israel and its Arab neighbors, hoping that a settle-
ment of the conflict would enable it to profit from closer relations with
both. The urgency of achieving a settlement of this intractable feud has
been underscored by recent threats by religious fundamentalism and
nationalist fanaticism to all participants: the United States, Israel, and
the majority of Arab governments. Closer relations of the United States
with both sides of the conflict would increase regional security, decrease
defense expenditures, expand trade opportunities, increase the quality of
life, and aid in the fight against destabilizing forces, such as Islamic
fundamentalists that seek to overthrow U.S. allies in the Middle East.
A. Recent Developments in the Middle East
Recent and unprecedented developments in the Middle East point in
the direction of peace. The startling mutual recognition between Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), brokered by Norway's
Foreign Minister, Johan Jorgen Holst,' proved that nothing is impossible
in the Middle East. The subsequent signing of the Israeli-Palestinian
Declaration of Principles at the White House 2 gave impetus to efforts to
resolve the broader feud between Israel and its neighbors, Syria, Leba-
non, and Jordan.' Just one day after the handshake between Yitzhak
Rabin, Israel's prime minister, and Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the
PLO, Jordan signed a breakthrough accord with Israel, agreeing on an
agenda for future negotiations. 4 This accord was followed by an eco-
nomic cooperation agreement between Jordan and Israel.5 While the
Syrian and Lebanese tracks have been at an impasse for Israel - mainly
because Prime Minister Rabin has indicated that the Israeli public needs
some time to absorb the already monumental changes it is experiencing
- a gesture of genuine interest in peace by Hafez Assad, the president
of Syria, could ready Israelis for an agreement on those fronts too.
6
1. See, e.g., Kevin Fedarko, Swimming the Oslo Channel, TIME, Sept. 13, 1993, at 50;
see also Clyde Haberman, P.L.O. and Israel Accept Each Other After 3 Decades of Relentless
Strife, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at Al.
. 2. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Rabin and Arafat Seal Their Accord as Clinton
Applauds 'Brave Gamble', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1993, at Al; George J. Church, All Together
Now, TIME, Sept. 20, 1993, at 36.
3. Owing to intensive U.S. diplomatic efforts, Israel has been engaging in direct negotia-
tions with all three countries for two years now. See, e.g., Jackson Diehl, Israel, Arabs Meet
for Historic Peace Talks, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1991, at Al.
4. See Elaine Sciolino, Jordan and Israel Agree on a Basis for Finding Peace, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1993, at Al.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 205-208.
6. See William E. Schmidt, Syrian Leader Plays a Waiting Game, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1993, at AS.
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Regional peace talks, whose participants include Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Morocco, and other Arab countries, have also progressed.7 For
the first time, Arab countries exhibited readiness to partake in joint
regional projects with Israel and agreed to host multilateral peace talks
in the Middle East.8 Four of the five panels on regional issues will hold
their next sessions, scheduled for the spring of 1994, in Arab countries:
Qatar will host arms control talks (marking the first time that an Israeli
delegation is officially invited to Qatar);9 Oman will host talks on
water;' o Morocco will be the host of economic development talks;" and
Egypt will host refugee discussions. 12 In addition, Kuwait announced
that it would drop its secondary economic boycott of Israel. 13 Further-
more, Morocco's King Hassan welcomed Prime Minister Rabin amid
reports that Morocco was close to entering into diplomatic relations with
Israel. 14
B. Using Economics to Advance Peace
In the context of the developments in the Middle East, one way to
improve the prospects for peace would be through the use of economic
incentives. Economic interaction between two countries not only pro-
duces economic gains, it also increases political and regional stability.
Under the right conditions, nations that engage in sufficient economic
transactions will at some point become interdependent and share a
vested interest in maintaining peaceful relations with their economic
partners. Under ideal conditions, economic interaction also brings down
cultural barriers and dampens long-running animosities. As Arabs and
Israelis interact with one another and learn to work together, the enemy
will be humanized and stereotypes will be debunked. Economic interac-
tion thus cements coexistence.
7. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Arab-Israel Talks on Regional Issues Start in Moscow,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1992, at Al, A8.
8. See David Makovsky, Multilateral Arms Control Talks to Be Held in Qatar in Spring,
JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 17, 1993, at A3.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. David Makovsky, Kuwait Lifts Secondary Boycott of Israel, JERUSALEM POST, June
9, 1993, News Section; Peres Praises Kuwait for Lifting Boycott, MIDDLE E. INTELLIGENCE
REP., June 8, 1993; see also Martin Sieff, Saudis, Kuwaitis Vow Easing of Israel Boycott,
WASH. TIMES, May 5, 1993, at A7.
14. Roger Cohen, Rabin Meets Hassan, Reporting Step Toward Tes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1993, at A16.
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A positive cycle of peace and economic expansion could be set in
motion in the Middle East: strong economic relations would enhance
political stability; political stability, in turn, may create more certainty
and safety in the market; market stability would then foster economic
growth because investor confidence would be bolstered. As U.S. inves-
tors see the risks of war diminish, they may be more willing to take
advantage of the enormous economic opportunities in the Middle East,
including opportunities that stem from mixing Israeli and Arab factors
of production according to each country's comparative advantages, and
opportunities created by existing federal programs that reward U.S.
companies for trading with U.S. allies in the Middle East.
Israelis and Palestinians view economic interaction and growth as so
critical to long-term stability that two articles and two annexes to their
Declaration of Principles address and recognize the mutual benefit of
regional economic cooperation. 15 The envisaged agreement between
them creates an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee
that is charged with developing and implementing a number of coopera-
tive programs, as well as with encouraging other countries and interna-
tional entities to investin the region and provide economic assistance to
the signatories.6
The prospect of economic prosperity could also act as an incentive
for peace in the Middle East. 7 Highlighting existing benefits of econom-
ic cooperation and offering additional tangible long-term economic
incentives may compensate for the immediate risks of concessions on
the path toward peace. As countries see the economic benefits of peace
materialize, they will be more willing to take measures in the region that
will allow them to benefit. In this way, countries like Jordan, Morocco,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Tunisia, and even Syria, all of which at
one point or another have flirted with the possibility of establishing
relations with Israel, may be prodded into taking their first step toward
normalized relations.
The problem lies in breaking the negative cycle of mistrust, vio-
lence, and instability. Nations at war that have no economic relations
with each other have few concrete shared interests that will push them
15. Declaration of Principles between the Government of the State of Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization, Sept. 13, 1993, arts. XI & XVI and annexes III & IV, draft
declaration reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1993, at A8.
16. Id. art. XI and annex IV.
17. See generally Daniel Lubetzky, The Influence of Economics In Resolving The Arab-
Israeli Conflict (Apr. 30, 1990) (unpublished thesis, on file with author); Daniel Lubetzky,
Trouncing Barriers to Conflict Resolution: A Steer Toward Peace in the Middle East, 1
STAN. J. INT'L AFF. 109 (1992).
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toward peace. Mistrust and bad will outweigh the potential benefits of
social and economic interaction. The state of war makes it impossible
for opposing sides to enter into economic relations with each other. The
risk of war alone discourages even internal investment and growth.
C. The Role of the United States
What the Middle East lacks is an intermediary that will highlight the
benefits of peace and reward those bold enough to swim against the
political tide of the status quo. A force is needed that will push coun-
tries gradually to overcome the relative sense of comfort in the status
quo and to dare to take risks for peace. What is needed is a catalyst that
can bring Arabs and Israelis together in a neutral setting where they will
become necessary partners and will have to work together in order to
succeed.
The United States could be the catalyst for peace, helping Arabs and
Israelis work together. A U.S. company would be an ideal intermediary
between two adversaries that have traditionally approached business in
very different ways. It could be a key third party, serving as mediator,
counselor, arbitrator, and friend. As a bridge between Arabs and Israelis,
the U.S. partner would not only provide its share of capital, labor, or
technology, but would also supply valuable interactive skills.
In addition to the inherent benefits that would inure to Middle
Eastern countries and to the global community in general, the United
States would benefit from this program in many ways. First and fore-
most, by bringing Arabs and Israelis together in a neutral work environ-
ment, the United States would hopefully, if slowly, bridge the gap
between them and create a climate more conducive to lasting peace; the
joint venture program would accelerate the positive effects of economic
interaction on political conditions. This would enable the United States
to maintain good relations with both Arabs and Israelis and to reap
strategic and political benefits from those relations. The United States
would thus also retain its title as the "leader" in the Middle East.
In addition, the U.S. government would help U.S. companies open
vast markets that have thus far remained untapped.1" Already, European
countries have been known to subsidize their enterprises to enable them
to enter Middle Eastern and other markets. The key to success in these
markets is early entry. "[C]ompetition among business enterprises to
18. See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, U.S. Plans to Insure Soviet Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1991, at D1.
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secure overseas markets has intensified dramatically.' 9 The United
States must meet the challenges of an "increasingly competitive and
interdependent global economic setting. '" 20
U.S. corporations would be used as a diplomatic tool to advance
U.S. economic and strategic goals. "[B]usiness enterprises can expect at
times to be used as pawns in a national government's quest to achieve
certain domestic or international goals.",2' This is not a new concept. It
has been tested and has succeeded.22 The idea first originated in 1950,
when Benjamin A. Javits, brother of the late Senator Jacob K. Javits,
wrote Peace by Investment.2 3 The Investment Guaranties Division of the
Agency for International Development (AID) was, from the outset,
deemed "a foreign policy arm of the government., 24 And the basic
standard used to decide whether or not to issue a guarantee was (and
continues to be) "the extent [to which] the project would further U.S.
foreign policy objectives. 25 Similarly, OPIC's goal is to make business
enterprises "complement[] the development assistance objectives of the
United States. 26 In addition, OPIC is required to take into consideration
human rights records in prospective host countries before approving
investment guarantees.27
The United States would also benefit economically from investment
in the Middle East. The United States stands to gain when U.S. com-
panies garner profits from these joint ventures. Helping U.S. companies
succeed abroad is not only beneficial for maintaining their international
competitiveness; it is imperative for the survival of the U.S. economy,
given that international investment and trade are now an integral part of
the economy.28 In 1992, the United States exported over $365 billion,
19. EARL H. FRY, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 1 (1983).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 3.
22. For example, several U.S.-based multinationals were used as pawns by the U.S.
government during the Siberian natural gas controversy. Id.
23. BENJAMIN A. JAVITS, PEACE BY INVESTMENT (1950).
24. ALAN C. BRENNGLASS, THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION: A
STUDY IN POLITICAL RISK 11 (1983).
25. Id.
26. Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-175, § 231, 83 Stat. 805, 807(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200b (1988)) [hereinafter FAA of 1969].
27. 22 U.S.C. § 2199(i) (1988).
28. See FRY, supra note 19, at 7. By 1983, Americans had invested more than $227
billion abroad. Id. In 1990, Israel already had an imports market of $8 billion, and the United
States was (and continues to be) a major exporter of products into Israel. ECONOMIC OFFICE,
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL, WASHINGTON, D.C., GUIDE TO THE ISRAEL-U.S. FREE TRADE AREA
AGREEMENT 4 (rev. ed. 1990) (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law)
[hereinafter GUIDE TO I-U.S. FTAA].
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40% ($146 billion) of which went to developing nations and created one
million U.S. jobs.29
D. Advantages of Investing in the Middle East
There are many reasons to invest in the Middle East, particularly
now that the first rays of peace have begun to shine over the region.30
Israel has significant economic potential. It boasts a highly educated and
skilled labor pool," which is relatively inexpensive.32 A surplus of
scientists and engineers,33 provoked in part by the recent influx of Soviet
immigrants, and leadership in developing advanced technology are also
characteristic.34 In addition, several laws encourage foreign direct invest-
ment and provide special incentives to attract it,35 including tax breaks,
36
29. AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, WHY FOREIGN AID?, WE CAN'T
AFFORD NOT To 2 (4th ed. 1993) (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of International
Law) [hereinafter WHY FOREIGN AID?]. U.S. exports to foreign aid recipients grew by 70%
between 1986 and 1990. Id.
30. See, e.g., Bernard Avishai, Making the Desert Bloom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at
A21.
31. About 25% of Israel's budget is devoted to education. Over 70% of employees have
had at least 11 years of formal education. In 1985, almost 11% of the labor force held
academic degrees. Refael Benvenisti, Israel's Foreign Investment Policy, in THE U.S.-ISRAEL
FREE TRADE AREA AGREEMENT 26.07 (Andrew James Samet & Moshe Goldberg eds., 1989)
[hereinafter U.S.-I FTAA].
32. In 1983, labor costs were significantly lower in Israel (average $4.78 per hour) than
in the United States (average $12.26 per hour). Id. at 26.08.
33. "Thirty out of every thousand people are engineers or scientists, compared to 25 in
the United States and 18 in Japan." Nathan Sharony, Investing in Israel - A New Reality, in
ECONOMIC HORIZONS 1990-9I, at 21 (1990) (published by American-Israel Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, Inc.) (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC HORIZONS].
34. Nearly 40% of Soviet immigrants have higher academic training, and an "unusually
high number" of engineers, researchers, and architects are represented. Emanuel Genauer,
Economic Overview, in ECONOMIC HORIZONS, supra note 33, at 16.
35. See Encouragement of Capital Investments Law 5719-1959 (Israel) (English transla-
tion published by A.G. Publications Ltd., Haifa, Israel (3d ed. 1992); Encouragement of
Industry Law (Israel) (full Hebrew text reprinted in HOK I'DUD HASHKAOT HON, HOK I'DUD
HATAASIA (Shlomo Peretz ed., 1992). See generally PANNELL KERR FORSTER (ISRAEL) LTD.,
NON-RESIDENTS GUIDE TO INVESTMENT AND TAXATION IN ISRAEL (1986) (copy on file with
the Michigan Journal of International Law). In September 1990, the Law for Encouragement
of Capital Investments was substantially amended to increase the incentives provided.
36. A 50% annual depreciation rate on new industry machinery and equipment is offered.
FRY, supra note 19, at 197. Other provisions permit up to 400% accelerated depreciation rates
for "approved enterprises." Tax holidays providing a full exemption from income tax on
profits earned during a five- to twelve-year period are also possible for certain investments.
See, e.g., id.; MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION OF ISRAEL, PROPOSALS FOR INVESTMENTS AND
INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION IN ISRAEL (1990) (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of
-International Law); KESSELMAN & KESSELMAN, GUIDE TO UNITED STATES INVESTMENT IN
ISRAEL 28 (1991) (Israeli C.P.A. firm publication; published in cooperation with Arnold &
Porter, Washington, D.C.). Additional tax incentives are available for investment in oil
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grants for investments in "developmental zones" and in fixed assets,37
research and development grants,38 guidance by government agencies,
investment guarantees, and other subsidies.39 Although bureaucracy
dominates the atmosphere, the situation has improved since the govern-
ment undertook an economic reform and privatization program.' Israel's
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew from $36.7 billion in 1987 to
$58.6 billion in 1991. 41 Shares in the twenty-eight Israeli companies
most widely traded in the United States increased by an average of
150% in 1991.42
Arab countries also offer many attractive features. Some of the most
expansive yet unexplored markets are found in the Arab world. Egypt,
which craves investment and imports for its more than forty million
inhabitants, has instituted an economic reform program.43 Moreover,
consumers in oil-rich nations, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, have a high spending power. Labor costs, which are one main
determinant of enterprises' location decisions,' are extremely low, and
exploration, film production, and the Eilat Free-Trade Zone - a free port area with invest-
ment incentives of its own. ISRAEL INCOME TAX COMMISSION, THE ISRAEL INVESTMENT
HANDBOOK 7 (1989) (published by the Israel Investment Authority under the auspices of the
Ministry of Finance of the State of Israel) (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of Interna-
tional Law) [hereinafter INVESTMENT HANDBOOK]. However, many tax benefits are neutral-
ized by double taxation of U.S.-Israeli corporations, due to conflicts between tax codes. See
infra text accompanying notes 88-94. This is an additional reason for the United States to
enact the provisions here advanced - if not to encourage, then at least not to discourage
investment in the Middle East.
37. Cash grants for up to 75% of investment in fixed assets are available. FRY, supra
note 19, at 197.
38. Up to 50% subsidies of research and development costs "on approved export-oriented
products" are available. Id. In addition, no value-added tax is imposed on exported goods. Id.
Exporters can also benefit from government sponsored financing plans facilitating credit and
loans by commercial banks, as well as from exchange rate insurance and political risk
insurance through the government sponsored Israel Foreign Trade Risk Insurance Company.
INVESTMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 16.
39. Training subsidies, low interest mortgages and loans, subsidized infrastructure costs
in developmental zones, and low-cost leasing are also available in various cases. FRY, supra
note 19, at 197.
40. Emanuel Genauer, Economic Overview, in ECONOMIC HORIZONS, supra note 33, at
19. In addition, the establishment of a "free export processing zone" - one that is liberated
from taxes and bureaucratic regulations - has been approved in principle. Israel, in Shift,
Backs 'Free' Industrial Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1993, at Al 1.
41. THE ROBINSON-HUMPHREY COMPANY, INC., INVESTING IN ISRAELI STOCKS: A
MANAGED ISRAELI GROWTH PORTFOLIO (on file with the Michigan Journal of International
Law) [hereinafter ROBINSON-HUMPHREY BROCHURE].
42. Id.
43. See NBE: A Comprehensive Programme for Supporting Investors, AL-AHRAM WKLY.
(Cairo), Oct. 14-20, 1993, at 5 [hereinafter Comprehensive Programme].
44. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND DISIN-
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labor is widely available. Many scarce natural resources, including oil,
gas, and water (the most scarce resource in the Middle East), are avail-
able in Arab countries.
For his part, Lebanon's president, Elias Hrawi, a billionaire entre-
preneur with an entourage of technocratic officials, has begun restoring
investor confidence in Beirut's capital markets.45 Palestinians also have
much to offer: the highest level of education in the Arab Middle East;
46
an enviable historic track record of improvement despite many adversar-
ies; 47 and stable public finance - no external debt and no over-bloated
public sector.48 Moreover, the PLO has proposed turning the Gaza
District into an economic free zone.49 A number of Arab countries,
including Syria, have also enacted laws to encourage foreign invest-
ments, providing incentives similar to those offered by Israel.5"
Combining Israeli and Arab comparative advantages with U.S.
expertise and capital could yield a product greater than the sum of its
parts. Together, Arabs, Israelis, and Americans may take advantage of
economies of scale and economies of scope. Relatively untested markets
are thirsty for development.
At the same time, a number of significant disadvantages loom in the
Middle East.5' Foremost is the risk of war, and the accompanying symp-
toms of exchange rate volatility, currency inconvertibility, and govern-
ment instability. In the past, inflation has reached triple figures in Israel,
CENTIVES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PROCESS 39 (1983) [hereinafter OECD]
(surveying investment incentive policies in OECD member countries).
45. Douglas Davis, 'Lebanon Will Recover with Peace', JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 18,
1993, at 14.
46. Peter Passel, Economic Scene: The Palestinians May Now Have a Chance to Spur
Their Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at D2 (stating that 2% of the population are
college graduates).
47. Id. (stating that output per person nearly doubled in 20 years, even while witnessing
3% annual population growth).
48. Id.
49. PLO Official Proposes Gaza Economic Free Zone, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 10, 1993,
at 14.
50. Syria, for instance, passed a well-received investment encouragement law in 1991,
exempting qualifying investors from certain taxes, customs duties, and regulations for five to
nine years. See, e.g., Robert S. Greenberger, Desert Bloom? Syria Loosens Grip on Economy,
Enjoys a Post-Soviet Bloom, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 6, 1994, at 1; Comprehensive
Programme, supra note 43, at 5 (describing Egyptian measures to stimulate investment and
creation of Investment Trustee Department by National Bank of Egypt); Tunisia Issues New
Investment Code; Complements Other Economic Reforms, Topics (Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation), Winter 1988, at 5 (new economic reforms include repeal of investment
preapproval requirements, sliding scale of tax and grant incentives, political liberalization,
privatization of economy, tax treaty with United States, and accession to GATT).
51. See generally Benvenisti, supra note 31, at 26.16-26.17.
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although it is currently under control.52 Moreover, the Arab boycott of
Israel creates significant hurdles for third parties who are caught be-
tween the boycott and U.S. laws forbidding compliance with the boy-
cott. The lack of democracy in many Arab governments also means that
peaceful transition cannot be ensured. The absence of an impartial
judicial branch and a developed legal system in some Arab countries
breeds uncertainty in the Arab markets. Furthermore, bureaucratic obsta-
cles are frustratingly common, and the Middle East economies suffer
from overregulation (in Israel) or overly rigid control (in many Arab
countries). Last, the ever-present liabilities of any investment on foreign
soil - cultural and language barriers, different business customs, dan-
gers of expropriation and political instability - are magnified in the
Middle East.
Joint ventures are an ideal medium of investment in the Middle East
because they make it possible to minimize the above-mentioned risks
and disadvantages, while maximizing the positive attributes of an invest-
ment.53 A joint venture "contemplates a pooling of resources, a sharing
of risks, a blending of areas of expertise and the creation of a common
entity for the achievement of objectives that would be exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible, for one of the joint venturers acting alone. 54
This is why OPIC encourages policy holders to enter into joint ventures
and multilateralize as a means of reducing risk.55 A joint venture allows
the undertaking of speculative endeavors without exposing assets to
unlimited liability.56
Joint ventures also benefit U.S. partners through the local exper-
tise contributed by the native partners, which offsets the problem of
investing in an unknown atmosphere. These joint ventures would
also offer the benefit of having Israel at the crossroads between two
continents, since it is the only country in the world that boasts free
trade agreements with both the European Union 57 and the United
52. Inflation is currently around 10% a year, as compared to 330% in the early 1980s.
ROBINSON-HUMPHREY BROCHURE, supra note 41. Inflation in 1993 is estimated to be at
11.5%. Jose Rosenfeld, Economists Pleased with CPI's 0.8% Rise in November, Inflation
Projected at 11.5% for the Year, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 16, 1993, at 9.
53. See FRY, supra note 19, at 70.
54. James A. Dobkin, Negotiating International Technology Joint Ventures between
American and Israeli Firms, in U.S.-I FTAA, supra note 31, at 10.02.
55. BRENNOLASS, supra note 24, at 229.
56. Dobkin, supra note 54, at 10.03.
57. Israel has a number of trade agreements with the European Union, in particular the
Free Trade and Cooperation Agreement of 1975, which has been followed by additional
protocols. Yaacov Cohen, Israel's Relations with the E.E.C. - Recent Developments, INT'L
ASSN. OF JEWISH LAW. & JURISTS, Nov. 6, 1992, at 1. The most important trade agreement,
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States.5" Thus, after a degree of local transformation, U.S. products
could penetrate both Israeli and European markets duty-free, because
the Israeli partner could provide access on competitive duty-free
terms.59
Yet another reason for which joint ventures are an ideal medium for
promoting Arab-Israeli interaction is that a joint venture can be struc-
tured so as to maintain equality - and thus equanimity - among its
partners. Arab-Israeli cooperation must be rooted in equality: every joint
venture must affirm that Arabs and Israelis are equals in order to heal
yesterday's vanquisher-conquered relationship.' Qualifying joint ven-
tures can and should be required to meet certain criteria that will ensure
equal standing among Arabs and Israelis. The mechanics to ensure this
are discussed in Part 11.61
E. Advantages of Investment Incentives as Foreign Policy Tools
Investment incentives would be cost effective as well. Federal
incentives to invest in targeted undertakings have an effect on com-
panies' decisions.62 Investment incentives work to offset existing risks
and disincentives 63 in even more direct ways than joint ventures, since
they act as direct subsidies for the targeted enterprises.
As early as 1958, a U.S. Department of Commerce survey indicated
that one-half of the participants in an investment guarantee program had
the Free Trade Area Agreement between Israel and the European Free Trade Area, signed on
September 17, 1993 in Geneva, admitted Israel into the European Free Trade Area as of
January 1, 1993. Just last December, the European Union promised to upgrade its trade agree-
ment with Israel, opening its borders further to Israeli products and services. EC Promises
Israel a Better Trade Deal, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 2, 1993, at 14.
58. INVESTMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 6. See also infra text accompanying note
142.
59. Dobkin, supra note 54, at 10.01. See generally YEHUDA RAVEH & Co., FREE TRADE
FROM EUROPE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VIA ISRAEL (European ed. 1993).
60. Mona Qassem, Prospects for a Regional Market, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Cairo), Nov.
4-10, 1993, at 4; cf. Shlomo Avineri, Palestinians' Place in the Sun, JERUSALEM POST, Dec.
3, 1993, at A4 (arguing that it is premature to interact economically initially, because existing
disparities in economic power can cause friction).
61. See infra text accompanying note 87.
62. See OECD, supra note 44, at 233. The OECD study found that investment incentives
have an effect, albeit a limited one, on investment decisions. See id. The main determinant of
investment decisions was found to be "expected output." But incentives did havean integral
and "direct impact" on timing, which is extremely important. Id. at 33-34. And incentives in
this case would be crucial since they would open the doors to expansive markets and thus
have an influence on the most important determinant, expected output. It is particularly
important to jump start economic interaction among Arabs, Israelis, and Americans, since the
full potential of growth through cooperation will only be achieved when barriers among the
countries are broken.
63. See FRY, supra note 19, at 153.
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"rested their decision [to participate] upon the availability of a
guarantee." 64 And the success of programs like OPIC is evidenced by
the number of applications and the systematic increase in participation,
from $450 million in guarantees issued in 195965 to billions of dollars
by 1983. 66 OPIC has prospered, as is reflected by the substantial
reserves it has amassed: at the end of the 1991 fiscal year, OPIC
reserves stood in excess of $1.6 billion.67 It is estimated that programs
like OPIC, the Export-Import Bank, and the Trade Development
Program "facilitated almost $18 billion in U.S. exports last year, result-
ing in 360,000 American Jobs. '68 The Congressional Research Service
has estimated that many successful investments in crucial sectors would
not have been made had OPIC insurance not been available.69
From time to time, the United States has enacted incentives similar
to the ones advanced in this article, although for different purposes.70
Congress has approved programs to facilitate adjustment from excess
capacity or international competition in the steel and textiles sectors; to
provide ad hoc assistance to individual companies that play a significant
role in certain areas of the U.S. economy; to promote research and
development; to encourage job creation in zones plagued by high un-
employment; to assist small business; and to rehabilitate factories,
warehouses, and stores in urban areas. 7 Some of the most prominent
federal agencies promoting economic development are the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, which administers the Urban
Development Action Grant Program; the Farmers Home Administration,
an agency of the Department of Agriculture; and the Economic Devel-
opment Administration, a unit of the Department of Commerce.72
Incentive programs are also widespread throughout the world.73
Competition is so intense that investment incentives by governments
64. BRENNGLASS, supra note 24, at 5, citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, RESPONS-
ES TO BUSINESS QUESTIONNAIRE REGARDING PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD 9 (1959).
65. BRENNGLASS, supra note 24, at 5, 11-12.
66. FRY, supra note 19, at 149.
67. OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (undated
pamphlet, on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law) (hereinafter OPIC EXECU-
TIVE SUMMARY].
,68. WHY FOREIGN AID?, supra note 29, at 2.
,69. IFRY, supra note 19, at 69. This includes up to 20% of U.S. private investment in the
oil industry.
70.: OECD, supra note 44, at 233-44.
71. Id. at 233.
72. Id. at 233, 243.
73. See, e.g., id. at 18.
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often "provide funding for 50 percent or more of the initial start-up
expenses of an international enterprise and 10 percent or more of the
costs of operating the business over a ten- to twenty-year period.,
74
Investment incentives that are aimed directly at corporations, such as
tax incentives, are more efficient and cost effective than many other
foreign policy outlays. "Providing tax incentives [is] more efficient than
giving direct grants in foreign aid. Funds [go] directly toward invest-
ment, and [do] not pass through a bureaucratic intermediary. Eliminating
the intermediary [reduces] the transaction costs and [abates] fears that
the funds were being embezzled by corrupt officials. 75
As it concerns insuring companies against political risk, OPIC was
created under the belief that "stimulation of the flow of private capital
would be less expensive for the U.S. government than direct govern-
ment-to-government loans.... 76 That belief was more than confirmed:
OPIC has managed to carry out its mandate profitably. "The agency has
recorded a positive net income for every year of operations, and has
returned its initial start-up appropriation of $106 million to the U.S.
Treasury. 77 During 1992, OPIC reported $180 million in profits.78
II. THE MECHANICS: How WOULD THE INCENTIVES WORK?
This Part discusses the four types of incentives that could be ad-
ministered to encourage investment in the Middle East. In the final two
Sections, concerns common to all types are discussed.
A. Tax Incentives
The first provision suggested here, tax incentives, is the easiest to
administer and enact. Tax incentives are highly attractive because they
would immediately stimulate private investment without any bur-
eaucratic hurdles. They may be structured in a number of different
ways, including capital investment tax credits, increases in allowable
deductions for capital investments, employee wage tax credits, or more
74. FRY, supra note 19, at 149.
75. Gregory C. Shaffer, An Alternative to Unilateral Immigration Contrnls: Toward a
Coordinated U.S.-Mexico Binational Approach, 41 STAN. L. REV. 187, 228 (1988).
76. BRENNGLASS, supra note 24, at 1. A constant debate has reigned in the United States
on whether OPIC should eventually be turned over to the private sector. See id. at 69-93.
Many viewed privatization as harmful to OPIC's "developmental" mandate and to U.S.
foreign policy in general. Thus, in 1978, Congress eliminated prior legislation that envisaged
turning over OPIC to the private sector. Id. at 87.
77. OPIC EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 67, at 2.
78. Joshua Shuman, OPIC Mission Bearing Fruits, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 29, 1992, at 4.
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favorable tax rates on net income for qualifying joint ventures. The
degree of incentive provided by these provisions could and should vary
according to the level of interaction that a joint venture fosters. The
more diverse the venture, the more rewards it should receive.
Setting a preferential tax rate is the most straightforward provision.
If an enterprise met the conditions to qualify as a joint venture under
this program, it would be eligible to be taxed at a lower rate. Suggested
rates are set forth below, according to an equity mix table. This provi-
sion, like all tax incentives suggested here, would be automatic and self-
administered.
Capital investment tax credits could also be granted to qualifying
joint ventures according to an equity mix table, as set forth below. The
idea of providing investment tax credits is not new. In the 1960s, the
United States signed a treaty with Israel (and Brazil and Thailand)
providing a 7% investment tax credit for investments therein, but Con-
gress never ratified the treaty.79 Capital investment tax credits seem to
have a greater impact on investment decisions than other tax incen-
tives, o although accelerated depreciation allowances can be structured to
achieve the same incentive goals, depending on the rates, phase-outs,
and reimbursability provisions used.
Accelerated depreciation allowances could be granted to enterprises
that invest new funds in the region into qualifying joint ventures. Any
purchase of capital, buildings, equipment, and depreciable land (i.e.,
land containing mineral deposits) could receive such treatment. The
incentives would permit qualifying enterprises to depreciate their assets
for tax purposes at rates a certain percentage higher than the ordinary
rate of depreciation. Since depreciation would be front loaded to the
early years, taxable income, and hence taxes, would be decreased in
early years. To qualify for this treatment, the assets would have to be
located in the Middle East and utilized by the eligible joint venture for
a particular, preapproved joint project.
Employee wage tax credits (EWTCs) could provide a tax credit to
the enterprise according to the number of workers employed. The em-
ployee wage tax credit allowance that each enterprise would receive
would be a percentage of the cost of paying the wages (or the minimum
wages) of all employees during their first five years of employment. Of
course, wages and salaries are already deducted from income as business
expen'ses. What the EWTIC allowance does is to reward job creators by
79. See Miller, Third World Views of Ends and Means of U.S. Tax Policy, in UNITED
STATES TAXATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 83, 91-102 (Robert Hellawell ed., 1980).
80. OECD, supra note 44, at 35.
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permitting them to offset taxes owed by an additional percentage of the
actual wages paid. (The EWTC could also be structured as a deduction
rather than a credit.)
Under a slightly less generous alternative, the EWTC would be
based on a percentage of the current minimum wage for each new
employee hired, rather than on the total actual wages paid out.8 ' Limit-
ing the allowable credit to a set minimum wage, even if the employee is
paid more than the minimum wage, serves to put a cap on the total
allowable credit.8 2 This measure could be important not just because it
decreases the amount of tax revenues that the government is giving up,
but also because it ensures that no incentive is created to raise employ-
ees' wages above efficient market wages.
EWTC allowances have been used frequently at the federal and state
levels to fuel employment. The state of California has such a program
for Enterprise Zones, 3 and has further passed an urgency statute to
revitalize areas that suffered from the 1992 Los Angeles riots. 84 Ap-
proximately eighteen months ago, some Democrats in Congress circu-
lated a plan to establish Enterprise Zones that would offer a "Targeted
Jobs Tax Credit,,8 5 and Puerto Rico has been lobbying Congress for a
similar program. 6
81. For an example of where this is done, see CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23625(b)
(Deering 1988) (providing hiring credit at percentage of "qualified wages," which are defined
as "that portion of hourly wages which does not exceed 150 percent of the minimum wage").
82. Yet another method of gradually scaling back the incentives and their costs is to
offer a decreasing percentage of the deductible basis as time elapses. For example, for
employees hired within the first six months, grant 100% of the deduction; for employees
hired over six months ago, but less than 12 months ago, provide 75% of the deduction; for
employees hired over 12 months ago, grant a 50% deduction, and so on. See, e.g., CAL. REV.
& TAX. CODE § 23625(a) (Deering 1988).
83. See id. §§ 17053.8-17053.10, 17053.17, 23622, 23623.5, 23625 (Deering 1988,
Supp. 1993, & Midyear supp. 1993); Enterprise Zone Designation Process, CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 10, § 5600 (1993); Employment and Economic Incentive Act, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2,
§ 1896.70 (1993).
84. See Los Angeles Revitalization Zone, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7100 (Deering 1988,
Supp. 1993 & Midyear supp. 1993) (providing tax benefits for businesses located in low
employment zones, including income tax credits for a portion of wages paid to previously un-
employed residents, tax credits for sales taxes paid on purchased equipment, and 100%
carryforward of net operating losses); see also Legislative Counsel's Digest, Cal. Assembly
Bill AB 38, May 14, 1992; Legislative Counsel's Digest, Cal. Assembly Bill AB 38X as
amended, August 31, 1992. Nonetheless, the legislation provoked significant debate. For
example, the Legislative Counsel commented that "[tihe proposal ... is unprecedented. The
state would essentially pay the salary of any worker, up to 150% of minimum 'age, for
construction businesses operating within the zone. Some question the fiscal prudence of such
a large subsidy of a private economic activity." Id. at 5 cmt. 2.
85. See, e.g., 138 CoNG. REC. S9,664-69 (daily ed. July 2, 1992). The proposal also
included Community Development Block Grants. Id. at S9,699.
86. Actually, Puerto Rico currently benefits from a yet more generous program.
However, a movement to repeal § 936, which provides the pertinent credits, has prompted
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EWTCs are particularly advantageous because of their dynamic
incentives: they keep up with higher employment and encourage growth.
Thus, EWTCs would stimulate additional investment in U.S.-Arab-
Israeli joint ventures and increase economic activity in the region.
Additional employment is extremely valuable in itself, because in-
dividuals who attain job and economic security will have a stake in the
system and will want to preserve stability. Thus, disenfranchised in-
dividuals who get jobs through this program can themselves become
guardians of coexistence. To encourage and reward growth in the pool
of employees, the enterprise could obtain tax credits set according to a
formula that takes into consideration both the level of growth and the
proportion of Arab and Israeli workers in each sector of the enterprise.
The specific formula is set forth below.
Since the objective of the legislation. is to encourage interaction
among Arabs, Israelis, and U.S. citizens at all levels, the tax advantages
should be scaled according to the level of interaction, the type of inter-
action, and the composition of the enterprise. Two measures could
gauge the venture's success in attaining a "good mix" and could deter-
mine how favorable a treatment should thus be accorded.
The first standard, equity mix, would be a measure of the equity
share of each of the three groups of participants (see Table 1). It would
be the standard utilized to assess the allowable capital investment tax
credits, accelerated depreciation allowances, or preferential tax rates.
The ideal equity mix would be for each of the three groups to have a
substantially equal share of no less than 30% and no more than 35% of
the same class and type of shares. These enterprises would qualify as
Type A Joint Ventures. This would mean that the Arab, U.S., and Israeli
groups of shareholders would all be on equal footing and have the same
rights. Presumably, they would have equal representation on the board
of directors and would all have a say in the election of officers. (It
seems too burdensome to impose additional requirements on the compo-
sition of the management and the directorate, but that would also be a
possibility.) Type A Joint Ventures would be eligible for a capital
investment tax credit of 10% per annum, for a 15% preferential tax rate,
and/or for a 50% accelerated depreciation deduction for the first five
87years. (Note that the legislator can choose whether to enact all, some,
or none of the tax provisions. They are not dependent on one another.)
some to request that at least some tax credit based on actual wages be provided. See Tax
Proposal For Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1993, at D7.
87. This would be in addition to any accelerated depreciation allowance already available
for other reasons. The set percentage would reflect the extra portion of asset value that could
be depreciated, stated as a percentage of the ordinary rate of depreciation. The specific
formula for the entire term of depreciation would depend on technical considerations.
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The second category would be Type B Joint Ventures, which would
consist of enterprises in which no group has less than 20% of the shares
and no group has more than 49% of the shares. This would mean that
the group holding the greatest number of shares would still need the
consent of at least some members of another group in order to take
actions requiring an absolute majority vote. Type B Joint Ventures
would be eligible for a capital investment tax credit of 7% per annum,
for a 20% preferential tax rate, and/or for a 30% accelerated deprecia-
tion reduction for the first five years.
The third category, Type C Joint Ventures, would consist of enter-
prises in which no group has less than 20% of the shares and no group
has more than 60% of the shares in the enterprise. The 20% minimum
requirement is designed to ensure that no tax concessions are granted
when a group purchases only a very small share of equity in order
technically to satisfy the law and to derive the benefits therefrom.
Although the holder of the majority of shares of a Type C Joint Venture
could make day-to-day decisions requiring a majority vote, it would
require the consent of at least one of the other groups (and perhaps both,
depending on the level of consent required by the firm's bylaws) before
making a decision requiring a supermajority vote (generally, a vote
requiring 80% or 90% in favor). Type C Joint Ventures would be eligi-
ble for a capital investment tax credit of 5% per annum, for a 25%
preferential tax rate, and/or for a 20% accelerated depreciation reduction
for the first five years.
The second standard that could be utilized, labor mix, would be a
measure of the mix of all workers in the enterprise (see Table 2). This
test seems most appropriate to determine ,the adequate level of EWTCs
that each qualifying joint venture should receive. In this case, the num-
ber of U.S. laborers would not be as important as ensuring that Arabs
and Israelis are represented on a balanced level in all tiers of employ-
ment. Thus, the test would consist of finding the percentage or fraction
of Arab and Israeli entry-level laborers, the percentage or fraction of
Arab and Israeli mid-level office workers, and the percentage or fraction
of Arab and Israeli professionals or white collar workers in the business.
It would be dangerous and probably harmful to the work environment,
and to relations among Arabs and Israelis, if a disproportionate number
of Arabs were entry-level laborers while Israelis held a dispropo-rtioriate
number of the management positions, and vice versa. Therefore, the test
should be sensitive to significant differences in the composition of any
of the areas of work, while tolerating only small digressions. ,The' fol-
lowing equation would achieve the desired goal:'
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Index = 100/7500 [(A - 50)2 + (B - 50)2 + (C - 50)2]
Labor Mix = EWTC Allowance = 100 - Index
where A is the percentage of laborers held by the group constituting the
majority of laborers; B is the percentage of office workers held by the
group constituting the majority of office workers; and C is the percent-
age of management held by the group constituting the majority in
management.
The Index would be subtracted from 100, and the resulting number,
reflecting the labor mix, would become the EWTC allowance, stated as
a percentage of the employees' wages (or alternative minimum wages)
that the specific enterprise would be eligible to claim as an offset
against its income taxes.
This formula is only illustrative. Under its current form, the average
credit that would result from it is probably too high. Of course, the
formula could and should be adjusted by policymakers to reflect the
exact amount of credits that policymakers deem warranted. This could
be done by multiplying the resulting EWTC allowance by a fraction set
by the policymakers (e.g., 1/4).
An example should highlight the sensibility of this equation. If Arab
workers in an enterprise accounted for 63.33% of the total labor in each
of the three tiers, the following equation would apply:
Index = 100/7500 [(63.33 - 50)2 + (63.33 - 50)2 +
(63.33 - 50)2]
The Index would be 7.1. The EWTC allowance would be 100 - 7.1
= 92.9. This means that this corporation would be allowed to offset
from its taxes 92.9% of the total wages (or alternative minimum wages)
that it paid out during the year for each new employee hired. (As men-
tioned above, this amount would actually be lower after being multiplied
by a set fraction, i.e., 92.9 x 1/4 = 23.22).
In contrast, an enterprise in which Arabs and Israelis each accounted
for 50% of management and 50% of office workers, but where 90% of
the laborers were Arab, would fare much worse. Its Index would be
21.33, and its permitted EWTC allowance deduction would be 78.67%.
A linear equation would have treated both of the examples above identi-
cally, since the total digression from a 50% balance equals forty in both
examples ([(90 - 50) + (50 - 50) + (50 - 50)] = 40; [(63.33 - 50) +
(63.33- 50) + (63.33- 50)] = 40). However, our equation underlines big
differences and understates small ones. This result is desirable because
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harm would be more likely to occur in highly disproportionate environ-
ments, even if only disproportionate at one level, than in working envi-
ronments where small digressions are observable at every stage but
overall equality is retained. Note that enterprises in which one group
was represented purely in menial labor while another group controlled
management would be granted a zero EWTC allowance (i.e., each
"majority" group would hold 100% of the positions at its level).
Israel and certain Arab countries already provide very generous tax
treatment for foreign direct investment,88 but the benefit to many U.S.
companies is limited or nonexistent because, under the current system of
double taxation, 9 U.S. taxes absorb part or all of the benefit that would
otherwise inure to the multinationals. To the extent that Israeli or Arab
taxes are greater than U.S. taxes, such excess is avoided by Israeli or
Arab tax credits; but to the extent that Israeli or Arab taxes are equal to
or less than U.S. taxes, the effect of any Israeli or Arab concessions is
neutralized by increased U.S. taxes.9° If U.S. taxes were lowered, as
under this proposal, then Israeli and Arab incentives would function
properly and would not be offset by U.S. taxation.9'
Inversely, tax incentives offered by the. U.S. government work only
if they are not counteracted by Israeli or Arab government taxes.92 If
an amount that goes untaxed by the United States is fully or partially
taxed by another government, the benefit to the enterprise is limited or
nonexistent and the only effect is that the United States ends up ceding
taxation revenues to other countries. Thus Congress could require, as a
condition of participation in this program, that any government that
wants these incentives to be provided by the United States for
investment in its country would have to pass laws that accorded similar
88. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36, 50.
89. Gideon Klugman, Income Tax Considerations Related to the Free Trade Agreement
between the United States and Israel, in U.S.-I FTAA, supra note 31, at 14.01-14.02. A treaty
that would reconcile these differences, the United States-Israel Income Tax Treaty, is pending
approval by the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as Senate ratification. Jose
Rosenfeld, US Delays Approving Taxation Treaty with Israel, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 22,
1993, at 8.
90. On problems of double taxation in general, see Klugman, supra note 89, at 14.02.
91. Tax treaties with Israel and Egypt that were apparently never ratified would have
done precisely this: the United States would have extended tax sparing to tax reductions
granted under Israeli or Egyptian investment incentive laws. Matthew J. Kust, Tax Treaties
with Underindustrialized Countries, in LEGAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INVESTMENT 197, 208-209 (Crawford Shaw ed., 1962).
92. Cf. Shaffer, supra note 75, at 200-201, 227 (explaining how Mexican incentives may
be neutralized and rendered ineffective by U.S. taxation and U.S. countervailing duties).
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TABLE I - TAX CREDITS BASED ON EQUITY MIX
Type of Joint Type A Type B Type C
Venture Joint Venture Joint Venture Joint Venture
Capital Invest-
ment Tax Credit 10% 7% 5%
Preferential Tax
Rate 15% .20% 25%
Accelerated
Depreciation 50% 30% 20%
Reduction
TABLE 2 - SAMPLE EMPLOYEE WAGE TAX CREDITS
BASED ON LABOR MIx*t
Employee
Percentage Percentage of Percentage Wage Tax
of Majority Majority of Majority Credit
Laborers Office Workers in Management Index Allowance
100 100 100 100 0%
90 90 90 64 36%
80 80 80 36 64%
50 50 50 0 100%
90 50 50 21.33 78.67%
63.33 63.33 63.33 7.10 92.90%
• Note that the numbers in Table 2 may seem very large and generous. However,
they could be reduced, as explained above, by multiplying every EWTC allowance
by an across-the-board set fraction. In addition, the "alternative minimum wage"
limitation would significantly reduce the net allowable deductions.
t One could be misled into thinking that the numbers may be overstated because
they do not take into account U.S. participation. But the EWTC allowance formula
is expressly intended to ignore U.S. participation; U.S. participation does not affect
the equation. For purposes of this equation, the "whole" from which the share of
the work force is calculated includes only Arabs and Israelis, as explained above. If
the number of U.S. workers were allowed to affect the equation, it could create an
incentive against hiring U.S. workers in the joint ventures, because increased U.S.
participation would decrease the "majority's" share.
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treatment to qualifying joint ventures. This would mean, in effect, that
tax and investment policies would be coordinated at a trinational or
multinational level. Some commentators have insisted that harmoniza-
tion and reconciliation of foreign tax credit provisions is a prerequisite
to a successful program.93 A coordinated tax agreement would also be
superior because it would harmonize conflicting concepts of taxable
income, divergent definitions of "individual" as well as "corporate"
residency, and different rules on source of income determinations.94
Otherwise, double taxation will nullify any U.S. tax incentives.
B. Government Investment Guarantees and
Government Investment Grants
The second type of incentives advanced in this legislation proposal
are government investment guarantees and government investment
grants. Government investment guarantees are commitments by the
government to back a private investment and to compensate a third
party lender if the investment is lost for political (or other) reasons.
They serve primarily to assuage the lender's fears that the party seeking
private loans may default. The company's loss does not translate into
automatic forfeiture because redress can be sought from the government,
which is the guarantor of last resort. Since the government investment
guarantees decrease the risk of nonpayment by the joint venture, third
parties are more willing to lend to these enterprises, and at a lower
interest rate. A qualifying enterprise could receive government invest-
ment guarantees according to some set formula that increased directly as
the amount of total investments grew, whether the investments were in
tangible or in intangible property.
In contrast, government investment grants are more direct outlays of
federal funds than government investment guarantees. They serve to
subsidize certain projects that will benefit the granting nation in direct
and substantial ways. The government investment grants would act as
direct subsidies to compensate for the risks undertaken by U.S. com-
panies, and to reflect government acknowledgment that those pioneering
investments help U.S. businesses in general. A qualifying enterprise
could receive nontaxable government investment grants according to
some set formula that increased directly as the amount of investments in
tangible fixed assets grew.95 For example, government investment grants
93. See, e.g., id. at 227.
94. See, e.g., Klugman, supra note 89, at 14.02-14.09 (United States taxes on worldwide
income basis, whereas Israel taxes based on territorial system); KESSELMAN & KESSELMAN,
supra note 36, at 52; Shaffer, supra note 75, at 228 n.283.
95. Ordinarily, government grants are only awarded with respect to acquisition of
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could be awarded as a percentage of the cost of physical assets acquired
by a company.
OPIC is an independent U.S. government agency that offers
medium- to long-term financing for overseas investment projects encom-
passing significant U.S. equity and management participation.96 It con-
ducts the national investment guarantee program and occasionally
(although rarely) awards grants to enterprises whose investments
advance the interests of the United States.97 It also provides political risk
insurance. OPIC's project financing takes account of the economic,
technical, marketing, and financial soundness of an investment. 98 For
example, it requires that there be an adequate cash flow and, in general,
that the project be financially and commercially viable.99 OPIC "does
not offer concessional terms usually associated with government-to-
government lending ... ;"00 in other words, OPIC claims that it will
not provide subsidized rates. It will not participate in projects that
adversely impact the U.S. economy or employment situation in a
significant way:'0 ' "OPIC will not support a runaway plant....
OPIC's purpose is to further U.S. foreign policy and to enable U.S.
companies to compete with foreign rivals. Congress authorizes the
secretary of state to determine which countries are covered, as well as
the breadth of coverage. Direct loans generally range from $500,000 to
$6 million, while loan guarantees range from $2 million to $50
million. 10 3 As of November 1992, OPIC programs are available in 138
countries, including the following Middle Eastern and North African
countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen. °4 In addition, in 1992, OPIC created an Israel
tangible assets, since such substantial and direct subsidies require a stronger commitment and
risk by the private investor, arguably denoted by an investment in physical assets. Guarantees,
in contrast, are more freely awarded. See, e.g., KESSELMAN & KESSELMAN, supra note 36, at
30.
96. OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, INVESTMENT FINANCE 1-2 (undated
pamphlet, on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law) [hereinafter OPIC INVEST-
MENT FINANCE]. The U.S. beneficiaries must own at least 25% of the equity. Id. Preferably,
at least 51% of the venture should be held by privately owned firms or persons. Id.
97. On very selective cases, OPIC will also provide permanent capital through capital
stock acquisitions, thereby agreeing to become an equity partner. But equity participation is
rare and is currently not offered in the Middle East. Id. at 10-12.
98. Id. at 2.
99. Id. at 2-3.
100. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 4; see also infra text accompanying note 195.
102. OPIC INVESTMENT FINANCE, supra note 96, at 4.
103. Id. at 8.
104. OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, COUNTRY AND AREA LIST (Nov.
[Vol. 15:405
Winter 1994] U.S. Investment in Arab-Israeli Joint Ventures
Growth Fund.'05 Moreover, OPIC has slated $100 million over the next
two years for West Bank and Gaza Strip projects pursuant to Secretary
of State Warren Christopher's commitment' °6 The loan guarantee and
grant measures proposed in this article could be administered by OPIC
without significant difficulty.'0 7
C. Government Investment Insurance
Government investment insurance consists of "insurance contracts
under which the United States agrees to insure private investors against
losses arising from certain political and economic risks."'' 08 A policy can
cover losses due to political risk, currency inconvertibility, war (broadly
defined as including insurrection, revolution, and civil strife), or ex-
propriation (including confiscation and nationalization).,°9 The insurance
could protect assets, expected business income, or both."0
A government-backed insurance provider would fare much better
than a private insurer for two reasons. First, and most important, it can
exert influence on host governments to ensure that its interests (the
aggregation of all of the private business interests it insures) are protect-
ed and respected. It can utilize its political, economic, and military
power to persuade foreign countries to abide by free market rules.
Second, it can take advantage of economies of scale and scope,
representing multiple enterprises at the same time as it advances its
agenda.
As a condition of providing this insurance coverage, perhaps at a
subsidized rate, the government agency could require that the underlying
investment contract include a dispute settlement procedure, that the
rights of the enterprise be subrogated to the government's rights if
insurance is paid out, and that the insured comply with all of its
1992) (sheet published by OPIC; copy on file with the Michigan Journal of International
Law).
105. See Shuman, supra note 78.
106. See infra text accompanying note 157.
107. See infra text accompanying note 156.
108. BRENNGLASS, supra note 24, at x.
109. Currency inconvertibility coverage generally compensates investors who cannot
convert their funds because stringent foreign exchange restrictions are enacted in new
regulations or are de facto enforced. But this type of coverage does not generally insure
parties against devaluation. OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, INVESTMENT IN-
SURANCE 3-4 (undated pamphlet, on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law)
[hereinafter OPIC INVESTMENT INSURANCE]. However, standard futures and forward contracts
in the private sector can insure against this contingency.
110. OPIC offers both types of coverage: Assets Coverage, which compensates for
damage to property, and Business Income Coverage, which covers income losses resulting
from damage caused by political violence. Id. at 4-5.
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contractual obligations."' The investments would have to be in new
projects, or in expansions or modernizations. Other requirements could
also be set out."2
OPIC currently administers a program of risk reduction to encourage
and enable U.S. entities to invest abroad. It helps finance the risks of
investing abroad. "Insurance is available for new ventures or expansions
of existing enterprises, and can cover equity investments, loans, techni-
cal assistance agreements, leases and other long-term exposures." ''
OPIC contends that its services are priced at market (not subsidized)
rates, and that it conducts its "financing operations on a self-sustaining
basis" and with "due regard to principles of risk management." 4 Israeli-
sponsored companies, as well as commercial companies, also offer
certain types of political risk insurance," 5 but they do not coverall con-
tingencies and the policies are not subsidized.
OPIC is well-suited to administer the government investment in-
surance incentives proposed here. However, some changes would have
to be made to its guidelines in order to accommodate this specific
provision. For example, currently OPIC may only insure investors who
are (1) citizens of the United States; (2) corporations, partnerships, or
entities created under U.S. laws and which are beneficially owned by the
United States (i.e. over 50% of each class of stock must be owned by
U.S. citizens); or (3) foreign businesses at least 95% owned by investors
eligible under (1) or (2) above." 6 Arguably, U.S. "investors" who form
part of a joint venture would be eligible for insurance under these
criteria,"' but the joint venture itself, as a whole, would not. In order to
make the joint venture itself eligible, an express exception for this
investment vehicle would probably have to be added to the OPIC
rules."' In addition, the U.S. government would have to consider
whether it is worthwhile to provide subsidized rates to encourage
pioneering investments in these endeavors.
111. See, e.g., id. at 10-11, 14.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 124-28.
113. OPIC INVESTMENT INSURANCE, supra note 109, at 2.
114. BRENNGLASS, supra note 24, at xi.
115. See INVESTMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 16; see also Joshua Shuman, Dutch
Firm Decides to Enter Local Trade Risk Insurance Field, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 15, 1993, at
8.
116. OPIC INVESTMENT INSURANCE, supra note 109, at 14.
117. See id. at 15 ("There is no requirement that the foreign enterprise be owned or
controlled by U.S. investors. However, in the case of a project with foreign ownership, only
the portion of the investment made by the U.S. investor is insured by OPIC. Insurance will
not normally be available for investments in enterprises majority-owned and controlled by a
foreign government.").
118. See infra part III.
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D. Middle East Investment Agency
The fourth idea that would facilitate joint ventures between U.S.,
Israeli, and Arab companies or individuals is the creation of a Middle
East investment agency. The Middle East investment agency would
promote economic interaction among Arabs, Israelis, and foreign in-
vestors by (1) providing vital but scarce information on cultural, legal,
economic, religious, and political differences in Middle Eastern coun-
tries; (2) supplying information about business opportunities and over-
tures; (3) helping private companies decipher the maze of U.S. and
Middle Eastern country regulations (many of which already provide
certain incentives for investment in Israel and Egypt); (4) guiding com-
panies through bureaucratic processes; and (5) in general, pointing to the
advantages of joint ventures with Israel and its Arab neighbors." 9 The
agency would not only help expedite and ease the immersion of foreign
enterprises into a new business environment; it would also take an
active role in promoting and nurturing such ventures.
The Middle East investment agency could be a government agency,
created by a legislative act and funded by the federal government, or it
* could be a quasi-governmental body, created by Congress but given free
reign in the private sector and a mandate to become self-sufficient by its
fifth year of operations. The investment agency woild be lightly staffed
by specialists with experience trading in the Middle East. Its guidance
on general business matters would be complemented by legal advice and
information on the foreign investment, trade, tax, technology, foreign
ownership, and joint venture laws of each country.
A main office could be opened in the United States, with liaisons in
Tel Aviv or another Israeli city, in Cairo, and, if possible, in Jericho,
Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Riyadh, Kuwait City, and Rabat. Guides
about each participating country would be published in English, detail-
ing the country's relevant laws, cultural and religious characteristics,
119. The government of Israel has created two agencies to encourage foreign direct
investments in Israel. The Investors Consulting Service, part of the Industrial Development
Bank of Israel, tries to solve bureaucratic problems and to provide general information,
economic statistics, guidance, and counseling, including free feasibility studies. THE INVEST-
MENT CENTER, INCENTIVES TO APPROVED PROJECTS 8 (Oct. 1990) (copy on file with the
Michigan Journal of International Law). The Investment Authority, which operates abroad
through Economic Representatives of the Israeli government, pr6motes industrial projects and
investments in Israel, as well as agreements for the protection of foreign investors. Id.
Although the objectives of these agencies are substantially more narrow than those envisaged
by the legislation proposed in this article, their structure and organization could serve as a
model for the Middle East investment agency, and coordination with them could avoid
duplication of efforts.
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political developments, and helpful administrative agencies. 20 The
investment agency would maintain close contact with its government
liaisons and would often request that administrative procedures be
expedited. A number of experts in different fields would probably work
as consultants on a pro bono basis and could eventually be hired on a
permanent basis. Companies or individuals interested in investing in
joint ventures with Arab and Israeli partners would be able to receive
consulting services and advice about their plans.' 2' A dispute settlement
mechanism could be set in place for the resolution of disagreements
through mediation or arbitration on a voluntary basis.
Research as to investment opportunities in each country, as well as
to the specific needs and strengths (comparative advantages) of each
country, would be conducted on an ongoing basis. Findings would be
published through media and marketing sources and through direct
contact with potential investment sources. Meetings, symposia, and trade
shows could be organized in various cities to encourage interaction
among business leaders from the Middle East and the United States, and
to enable potential investors to find suitable and profitable ventures. 22
The investment agency could search for creative business plans suggest-
ing ways in which Israel, Arab countries, and the United States could
join in their efforts to create a socially and economically beneficial
venture, business or academic, scientific-based or not. A competition
could be organized, with the best joint venture plans receiving an award.
Sponsors for the plan would then be sought within the network of
potential investors.
120. As part of its Investor Service, OPIC currently offers "kits" published by the
Investor Information Service, a publishing clearinghouse. These provide information about a
country's (or a set of countries') business, economic, political, and social climate. See OVER-
SEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, INVESTOR SERVICES 5 (undated pamphlet, on file
with the Michigan Journal of International Law) [hereinafter OPIC INVESTOR SERVICES].
These information kits can serve as a basic model for the Middle East investment agency's
publications, but the guides envisioned in this article would have to be much more detailed:
they would analyze all applicable U.S. and host country laws.
121. The Investor Services branch of OPIC also offers fee-based "Advisory Services"
that include assistance with business planning, joint venture partner identification, and
feasibility evaluations. It can even help by trying to secure legal and investment information
from other sources. But the Investor Services are very general in scope and thus sacrifice
specificity and in-depth specialization. They emphasize general business strategy, but general-
ly lack any expertise on the Middle East. They also lack up-to-date information on specific
business needs and opportunities. See id. at 2.
122. OPIC occasionally sponsors "Investment Missions" to various countries or regions.
See id. at 2-3. Although the Missions are seldom conducted in the Middle East (as far as
could be ascertained, no Missions to any country in the Middle East were scheduled for 1993,
see Overseas Private Investment Corporation, OPIC Poised to Start 1993 with Full Missions
Schedule, OPIC Investment Missions Update (Nov. 1992) (flyer/newsletter, on file with the
Michigan Journal of International Law)), these provide an excellent example of how the
Middle East investment agency could go about introducing potential investors to possible joint
venture projects.
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E. Eligibility
There are several options regarding the types of companies and
individuals eligible for these incentives. For ease of reference, this
article refers to joint ventures of U.S. companies with Arab and Israeli
companies. The actual legislation would probably not require the ex-
istence of an Israeli or Arab corporation. The U.S. company could be
structured in any way - as a sole proprietor, an interested investor, a
partnership, a cooperative society, or a corporation (though the structure
or composition of the company could have an effect on the substantive
provisions that determine the degree of available incentives). Rather,
what would be required is that the U.S. entity take advantage of certain
factors of production in both Israel and some Arab country or in the
occupied territories. The recipient of government investment grants or
guarantees or of tax incentives could be any U.S. citizen, corporation,
association, or partnership "substantially beneficially owned by United
States citizens, as well as any wholly owned foreign subsidiary of any
such corporation."' 3 Fifty percent ownership should qualify as substan-
tial ownership. The emphasis would be on substance rather than on legal
definitions. The joint venture would not necessarily have to be a "sepa-
rate legal entity" in the strict sense of the term. For example, a U.S.
company could contribute its own capital, use Arab labor and manage-
ment and Arab raw materials, and employ Israeli technology and scien-
tists. If a minimum mix of Israeli and Arab cooperation were met, the
U.S. enterprise's operations could qualify for these programs, with the
benefits awarded varying according to the degree of interaction dis-
cussed above.
Similarly, the "Arab and Israeli" requirement would be flexible. For
purposes of this program, a venture among Americans, Israeli Jews, and
Israeli Arabs would be eligible for these measures, as would a venture
among Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians living in the occupied
territories. So long as the objective of interaction between Arabs and
Israelis was met, the incentives would be available, and the investment
agency would be willing to lend its support.
F. Safety Mechanisms
To ensure the smooth operation of the program and the achievement
of congressional objectives, a number of safety mechanisms and condi-
tions would have to be put in place. The U.S. legislation would have to
overcome the danger of causing a simple trade diversion without real
123. Terminology borrowed from statutes cited in BRENNGLASS, supra note 24, at 9.
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job creation. Attention must be paid to ensure that U.S. companies
which benefit from this new legislation are truly investing in ventures
with Israeli and Arab partners and are not just using the corporation as
a store front-to derive the benefits of the U.S.-Israeli Free Trade Area
Agreement - and of the incentives proposed in this article - by fun-
neling products from other countries through Israel. Thus, incentives
could be restricted to fields where interaction will necessarily occur, i.e.,
in manufacturing, research and development, or other elaborate process-
es. Mere exportation of products, without more, could be deemed not to
qualify for these measures. Additionally, a minimum percentage of
national factors of production could be required even for companies that
meet the equity mix test.
Another consideration is that some businesses that planned to invest
in certain schemes anyway will get a windfall. There seems to be no
effective way to prevent this; even requiring that eligible investments be
"new" would not eliminate this danger. But given the current paucity of
joint ventures among Arabs, Israelis, and U.S. citizens, this is not a
major concern.
Some believe that the competitive atmosphere in the commercial
arena will only increase friction and tensions among Israelis and Arabs,
particularly if Israelis are seen as oppressive employers and Palestinians
continue to be hired only for menial positions. This problem may al-
ready have been solved by the equity mix requirements set forth above,
but more stringent provisions or preapproval requirements could also be
added. Preapproval of a company's plan by an agency would be bur-
densome and costly, but the agency could monitor against abuse and
could be granted the discretion to deny funding to ventures that are
more prone to cause, rather than alleviate, tension. The agency could
also be required to ascertain whether the venture will be a good in-
fluence on the peace process and whether it will further, or at least not
undermine, the strategic interests of the United States.
In order to minimize the costs of the investment guarantee and grant
incentives, the granting agency could be required to ascertain that the
firm has a realistic chance of success. Current law mandates that OPIC
manage and minimize risks; several risk-minimization techniques are
already practiced by OPIC'24 and seem to be working. Additional perfor-
mance and review requirements could be imposed, and a recommenda-
tion by an industrial development bank or by another objective third
party could be a prerequisite.
Fraud and abuse will have to be prevented through stringent mea-
sures, many of which are already available under the OPIC enabling acts
124. Id. at 217-60.
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and under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. Additional mechanisms
would have to be added to prevent employers from hiring and then
firing employees, or from investing and then withdrawing funds for the
sake of receiving a tax reduction.'25 For example, employees whose
wages are partly deducted by the joint venture would have to be em-
ployed for a set minimum period. 26 Furthermore, restrictions on the
permissible payment of dividends to shareholders could be imposed.27
In addition, restrictions on the ability to repatriate funds or to with-
draw them from an investment could be imposed on participating enter-
prises. This measure could be administered on an ex post facto basis
(i.e., if a company or individual has benefitted, it shall not repatriate or
withdraw capital (or even profits) until five years from the date of the
initial investment) or on an ex ante basis (i.e., if a company or individu-
al wishes to benefit, it may not repatriate or. withdraw capital until five
years after the date of the benefit, or alternatively, after the date of the
initial investment). Care would have to be taken to ensure that these
provisions did not conflict with other incentives, such as currency
inconvertibility insurance, which ensure repatriation. Exceptions could
potentially be allowed for extraneous circumstances or major business
exigencies forcing the investor to pull back, provided that good faith is
shown. Exceptions could also be made for mere shifts of capital from
one investment to another qualifying one, or for reorganizations as
opposed to full withdrawals.
The United States could also consider requiring cooperation by the
other Middle East governments before implementing the statute. Each
government could be requested to cooperate with the investment agency
in exchange for the willingness of the agency to promote foreign invest-
ment in, and development of, its country. A mechanism for speedy
review of complaints or concerns about bureaucratic impediments and
obstacles could be set up. A government official could be appointed to
serve as a liaison between government agencies and the investment
agency. The liaison should be a senior level official or, at the very least,
a junior official with sufficient influence and authority over the govern-
ment's trade and investment agencies. The endorsement of these
125. See, e.g., Change in Capital Investments Encouragement Law Proposed, JERUSALEM
POST, Dec. 10, 1993, at A9 (announcing possible amendment to Israeli law that would prevent
firms that close plants from receiving assistance from the State for five years).
126. The Archie-Hudson Bill, for instance, requires that employees be employed for at
least 270 days, with some exceptions. See Los Angeles Revitalization Zone, supra note 84,
§ 23625(h)(1), (2).
127. This type of "anti-abuse" restriction is imposed by the Investment Center, the Israeli
agency that administers investment incentive programs, on all approved projects. KESSELMAN
& KESSELMAN, supra note 36, at 33.
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programs by host governments would be important because it would as-
suage the fears of private investors, who would otherwise be ap-
prehensive about approaching Israel without official sanction from their
governments. 12
8
Someday, the concepts herein could be globalized. An international
guarantee institution could administer a multilateral investment program
that promoted joint ventures among Arabs, Israelis, and any third par-
ty. 29 This globalization would further the peace-seeking objectives of
this program by increasing the potential for Arab-Israeli interaction,
even though it would dilute the competitive advantage that would ar-
guably result from encouraging U.S. companies to be the first to invest
in the Middle East.
130
III. THE CONTEXT: WHERE DOES THE ENACTMENT FIT
WITHIN THE U.S. LEGISLATIVE SCHEME?
The new legislation would have to be harmonized with existing laws
in the United States. It would have to comply with the Internal Revenue
Code, other foreign aid provisions, and with the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Acts. For example, Congress recently passed
a provision prohibiting bilateral assistance to countries deemed to be
sponsoring terrorism.' 3' The new legislation would have to comply with
the requirements of this new provision. Thus Syria and Libya would be
unable to participate in this program unless they were taken off the list
of terrorist-sponsoring countries. (Federal financial assistance to Syria
has been made contingent on a number of additional conditions, includ-
ing allowing Syrian citizens the right and opportunity to emigrate., 32 In
128. See, e.g., Lamia Lahoud, Attracting Palestinian Investments, JERUSALEM POST, Nov.
26, 1993, at B2 (quoting businesspeople from the Gulf States and Jordan expressing that they
wished to keep a low profile, since their governments might question their loyalty).
129. Cf BRENNGLASS, supra note 24, at 8, 22, 99. There is already an international
organization that seeks to promote foreign investments by insuring them, the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), but its primary objective is to foster development of
Less Developed Countries. Like OPIC, MIGA provides political risk insurance to offset risks
of investments abroad. But MIGA's purpose is different and arguably more limited. Estab-
lished relatively recently (in 1985) by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (the World Bank), MIGA is not an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, but rather an
independent international organization. See generally IBRAHIM F.1. SHIHATA, MIGA AND
FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1988). If MIGA would agree to broaden its stated purposes and to
encourage third parties to enter into joint ventures with Arabs and Israelis, it could probably
administer the programs that were suggested for OPIC to administer for the United States.
Given OPIC's rather focused objectives, however, it is unlikely that this would be the case.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
131. See Foreign Operations Appropriations, 138 CONG. REC. S15,947-01 (1992).
132. See, e.g., International Security and Economic Cooperation Act of 1991, S. REP.
No. 102-100, § 654 (Committee Report of the 102d Cong., July 2, 1991).
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December 1993, Syria announced that it would finally permit the free
movement of its Jewish citizens.)
On September 28, 1993, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
approved lifting restrictions on U.S. aid to the PLO and to multilateral
institutions that provide benefits to the PLO. 133 On October 12, 1993,
the House of Representatives passed the Middle East Peace Facilitation
Act of 1993, which was nearly identical in content to the Senate bill. 3
4
The measure, which gave the Clinton Administration until January 1,
1994 to waive the laws that ban aid to the PLO, was extended by six
months, until July 1, 1994.
31
Congress also passed a provision prohibiting assistance to Jordan
unless the president certifies to Congress that Jordan has taken steps to
advance the peace process in the Middle East and is complying with
U.N. sanctions against Iraq. The first condition may not present too big
of a problem for Jordan, since its participation in this program would a
fortiori signify a pro-peace stance. The second condition would need to
be monitored, but should not be a significant obstacle since U.S.-Jordan
relations have improved markedly over the last two years. Indeed,
President Clinton, in a conversation with King Hussein shortly after
Jordan signed an agreement setting the basis for negotiations with Israel,
pledged to reinstate $30 million in aid to Jordan. 36 All of these U.S.
laws must be reconciled before the statute is enacted, but no intrinsic
problem prevents this from occurring.
In addition, many laws in Israel and in Arab countries currently
impede the joint ventures envisaged by these provisions. Israel has a law
prohibiting trade with the enemy. 137 All Arab countries, except Egypt,
prohibit trade with Israel or with any company that trades with Israel. 38
133. Foreign Relations Committee Backs Waiver of Anti-PLO Laws, NEAR E. REP., Oct.
11, 1993, at 180.
134. House Waives Anti-PLO Laws, NEAR E. REP., Oct. 18, 1993, at 187.
135. U.S. Senate Votes to Extend Waiver on PLO, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 21, 1993, at 12.
136. U.S. Resumes Military Aid to Jordan, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 16, 1993; Arabs
Vow Truce in Territories but 10 Groups Seek to Disrupt Accord, ST. Louis DISPATCH, Sept.
17, 1993, at 3A.
137. Trading with the Enemy Ordinance § 7 (1939), cited in Ilana Ben-Ezra, Import
Legislation in Israel Law, in U.S.-1 FTAA, supra note 31, at 22.02. The Israeli government
recently took steps to remove Morocco and Tunisia from its list of hostile nations, paving the
way for trade with both. Jose Rosenfeld, Ministry Gives Morocco Green Light to Trade with
Israel, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 15, 1993, at 9.
138. The Arab economic boycott of Israel bans imports from, and trade with, all of the
following: (1) any Israeli company*(the primary boycott); (2) any company that itself trades
with Israel (the secondary boycott); and (3) any company that trades with a boycotted com-
pany (the tertiary boycott). The United States has passed anti-boycott legislation to prohibit
participation in, or compliance with, all facets of the Arab boycott. Export Administration Act
of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 8, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. App.
§ 2407 (West 1991)). It does not seem difficult to enact new legislation that would be
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Israeli and Arab laws need not be reconciled before enactment of the
statute, since part of the purpose of this legislation would be to create an
incentive toward such reconciliation. The United States could propose to
Israel and the Arab governments that when they stand ready to cooper-
ate and trade, the United States will encourage its companies to invest in
joint ventures with them. It would be up to the Middle East parties
themselves to decide whether to do so.
A. Existing Legislation
A great deal of U.S. legislation already exists in this arena, although
none directly addressing the idea of joint ventures. OPIC, created under
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, insures U.S. corporations operating
abroad against the risk of being nationalized (expropriated), as well as
against losses caused by war, revolution, insurrection, political violence,
or currency convertibility problems. 39 Its role and purpose are reviewed
in Part 11.140 OPIC has recently created an Israel Growth Fund
capitalized at between $50 and $75 million.14' At present, however, no
existing OPIC directive exists to foster or support U.S. joint ventures
with both Israeli and Arab partners.
Many federal acts and international agreements are designed to
foster U.S.-Israel cooperation (as distinguished from U.S.-Israel-Arab
cooperation). Israel and the United States have a free trade agreement
under which tariffs, quotas, and other barriers to trade between the two
countries are almost nonexistent.142 The Freedom Support Act, 143 whose
consistent with the anti-boycott statutes. The challenge here lies in persuading the Arab
countries to end the boycott against Israel. This could be accomplished by exerting political
pressure and creating strong economic incentives to end the boycott. Thus far, Arab nations
have insisted that it is "too soon" to renounce the boycott. Chris Hedges, Despite U.S.
Urging, Arab Lands Hold Firm to Their Israel Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1993, at A3.
Both houses of Congress are currently considering legislation that would deny defense aid to
countries that comply with the boycott. Hillel Kuttler, Congress: Tie Defense Aid to Boycott
Reversal, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 21, 1993, at 1. And many analysts, even in the Arab world,
have begun to insist that the boycott must cease because it may do more harm to the Palestin-
ians than to anyone else. See, e.g., Robert K. Lifton, The Boycott Boomerang, JERUSALEM
POST, Nov. 17, 1993, at 6; The Real Costs of Mideast Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1993, at 22.
U.S. "persuasion" might actually be having an effect; Gulf leaders met at the end of the year
to discuss whether they should take any action to relax the boycott. Gulf Leaders to Discuss
Ending Boycott, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 20, 1993, at 2.
139. FAA of 1969, supra note 26, §§ 2191-2200(b).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 96-107.
141. Shuman, supra note 78, at 4.
142. Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Israel, 24 I.L.M. 653 (1985); Israel Free
Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-47, 99 Stat. 82 (1985) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112). This is the first such agreement concluded by the United
States. GUIDE TO I-U.S. FrAA, supra note 28, at 2.
143. Freedom Support Act, Pub. L. No. 102-511, 106 Stat. 3320 (1992).
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main purpose is to authorize assistance to the former Soviet Union, also
designates $10 million in cooperative development projects among the
United States, Israel, and developing countries. Similar cooperative
development programs have occasionally been passed. These could serve
as models for the new legislation.
Israel and Egypt are, respectively, the first and second largest recipi-
ents of foreign aid from the United States. Besides the minimum $785
million given to Israel yearly under the Economic Support Fund,'"
Israel recently received $10 billion in loan guarantees to help in the
absorption of Soviet refugees. The guarantees serve as collateral and
enable Israel to obtain private loans at competitive rates. The United
States also maintains numerous strategic agreements with Israel, includ-
ing technical and military cooperation, joint commercialization of de-
fense technologies, collaboration in civilian space activities and other
scientific research, drug interdiction programs, and counter-terrorism
coordination. Congress allocated approximately $80 million to U.S.-
Israeli cooperation projects in its 1993 defense appropriations bill. 45 A
popular, if relatively small, program is the Israel-U.S. Binational In-
dustrial Research and Development Foundation (BIRD), co-founded in
1977 by the U.S. and Israeli governments to stimulate private sector
high-technology cooperation.
146
In addition, Congress created -a limited but successful scientific
cooperation program in 1979, and expanded it in 1985, under the Spe-
cial International Security Assistance Act of 1979.147 The Middle East
Regional Cooperation Program (MERC) is administered by AID and
fosters scientific and technological cooperation among Israel, Egypt, and
the United States. It issues funds, evaluates grant applications, and
monitors the progress of projects that address health, agricultural,
marine, and environmental problems common to both Israel and
Egypt. 148 Representative Henry A. Waxman (D-CA), its main sponsor,
144. International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Economic Support Fund, Pub. L. No.
95-384, § 532(b)(1), 92 Stat. 730, 734 (1978) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2151).
145. See Hillel Kuttler, It's Been a Good Year for Israel at the White House, JERUSALEM
PosT, Nov. 26, 1993, at BI.
146. See, e.g., Leslie Katz, BIRD Boosts Business Alliances for U.S., Israeli Firms,
JEWISH BULL., Feb. 26, 1993, at 4; Jonathan Fedler, The R&D Model, LINK MAG. (Israel),
Oct. 1993, at 28, 30. Besides industrial development, U.S.-Israel binational foundations also
exist in agriculture, science, and education.
147. Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-35, § 8, 93
Stat. 89, 92 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 3406 (198 1)))(stating that it is the policy of
the United States to support peace in the Middle East by financing scientific and technical
cooperative development projects among Israel, Egypt, and other nations).
148. MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL COOPERATION: BACKGROUND INFORMATION FROM THE
OFFICE OF REP. HENRY WAXMAN (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of International
Law) [hereinafter MERC FACT SHEET].
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stated that this program has "succeeded beyond [all expectations w]hile
using only 0.1 percent of annual U.S. aid to Egypt and Israel."'' 49 In the
1993 Fiscal Year Foreign Aid Appropriations Report, Congress
earmarked $7 million for Middle East cooperative programs.
Unfortunately, AID "has sought to limit publicity for the program to
prevent a backlash against Egyptian participants .... As a result, AID
receives few requests to fund new projects."' 150 Many members of Con-
gress believe more needs to be done. Waxman himself believes that a
broader and more active cooperation program must now be sought:
"Now that regional cooperation has proven itself, we must become more
ambitious. For the fact is that the present program is tiny .... Regional
cooperation must begin to behave in a more activist way ... reaching
out to new participants in new fields."''
In the past, other relatively small amounts have been drawn out of
the MERC annual budget and channeled into small, ephemeral pro-
grams, such as $500,000 in Arab-Israeli Peace Scholarships, which were
disbursed during one year only. 152 AID administers federal foreign aid
programs. In 1991, Congress "encouraged" AID to grant up to $350,000
to private voluntary organizations in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza
"for educational, cultural, and humanitarian purposes involving both
Israeli and Palestinian private citizens."'' 53 The Israeli-Palestinian agree-
ment prompted the U.S. government to commit $250 million over the
next two years to develop the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Existing
foreign aid appropriations will be reshuffled to make these resources
available. 54 In sum, a great deal of legislation encouraging U.S.-Israeli
cooperation exists. As of this year, the United States has also made a
commitment to spur Palestinian economic development.1
55
However, besides MERC and the limited grants designed to encourage
social interaction, there are no other laws encouraging Arab-Israeli
cooperation. No law providing incentives for trade and economic
149. Henry A. Waxman, Encouraging Mideast Cooperation through Scientific Research,
L.A. HERALD EXAMINER, May 5, 1986.
150. The Fruits of Peace, NEAR E. REP., Feb. 23, 1987.
151. Waxman, supra note 149.
152. The Arab-Israeli Peace Scholarships were established in 1987 by Continuing
Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 564, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-72
(1987), and repealed in 1988 by Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-461, § 558, 102 Stat. 2268 (1988).
153. S. REP. No. 100, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1991) (explaining that the Senate
Appropriations Committee report to accompany the fiscal year 1991 foreign operations
appropriation bill included statement to the above effect).
154. See infra text accompanying notes 157-59.
155. See id.
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interaction among Arabs and Israelis exists. More specifically, no law has
ever been considered that is designed to encourage U.S. companies to
invest in joint ventures with Arab and Israeli enterprises.
B. Ways to Enact the New Legislation
The provisions discussed in this article could be enacted in two
different ways. A new act could be passed which specifically advances
this program and creates the necessary agencies or mechanisms to
support it. Alternatively, each of the relevant provisions could be added
to an existing and related statute and adapted to existing programs. The
advantage of enacting a separate act and creating a new agency is that it
would stand on its own and carry greater symbolism; the commitment of
the United States to the peace process would be very clear. The disad-
vantages are that it would be less feasible politically; that it would be
harder to draft such a comprehensive statute; and that new, additional
mechanisms would have to be enacted, making it less expedient, less
efficient, and more costly.
On the other hand, integrating each provision into a relevant existing
statute arguably would be accompanied by less fanfare, but would also
involve less expenditure of political will. Simple amendments and
additions of supplementary provisions to existing bodies of law might be
subject to less opposition. In addition, drafting would be simpler, more
straightforward, and less time-consuming, since existing schemes could
be utilized and contingencies would already be well thought out.
Particularly with respect to the loan guarantee and political risk
insurance provisions, it would be far more logical and efficient to
incorporate a new mandate into existing functions of OPIC, whose
function is extremely compatible with these, than to create a new agency
to administer these programs. Thus, whenever possible, these provisions
are best pursued through integration into existing bodies of law.
Integration is possible with respect to the tax, loan guarantee, and
contingency risk insurance provisions. It is not possible, however, with
respect to the creation of a Middle East investment agency, except per-
haps by adding a substantial number of duties and functions to OPIC or
to AID. The tax provisions could be incorporated into the Internal
Revenue Code. Some incentives, such as accelerated depreciation incen-
tives, could be codified into already existing, related provisions. Other
incentives, like the investment tax credit, would require a separate
section, since the tax code does not currently contain any such
provision.
The loan guarantee and political risk insurance provisions could be
incorporated into the mandate of OPIC. For example, the law presently
mandates that OPIC emphasize investment in Less Developed Countries
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and in development of certain regions. 56 A provision would need to be
added stating that an additional objective should be advancing Middle
East peace and that, to that end, OPIC will give preferential considera-
tion to investment projects in joint ventures with Arab and Israeli part-
ners that are found to increase economic interaction among Israel and its
Arab neighbors in a constructive manner. Another consideration could
be whether the operation will aid in the social and economic develop-
ment of the region. The consent of the host government to cooperate
could be a prerequisite to approval of a guarantee.
A sample provision, to be added as an amendment to the OPIC
statute, could be the following:
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation will, upon the
request of an Israeli or Arab government, consult respecting pro-
jects in the Middle East proposed by nationals of the United States
of America and approved by the host country or countries. With
due regard to the strategic, political, and commercial interests of
the United States of America, OPIC may approve Government
Investment Grants and/or Government Investment Guarantees to a
Joint Venture between American nationals, Arab partners, and
Israeli partners if the New Investment promotes peaceful
cooperation and fosters economic interaction among Arab and
Israeli entities, nationals, or governments, and if the project aids in
the social and economic development of the region.
For the purpose of this provision, a "New Investment" includes
an investment to expand, modernize, or improve existing
enterprises.
Permissible guarantees could be limited to a set amount, and additional
safety mechanisms could be adopted. But most contingencies would
already be provided for under existing OPIC enabling laws.
A consulting provision could also be added, requiring preapproval
by OPIC before determining whether a corporation should receive grants
or guarantees. This is in contrast to tax incentives, which would be
automatically available to companies that met the guidelines.
IV. THE DISTINCTIONS: How DOES THIS PROPOSAL
DIFFER FROM RECENT AID COMMITMENTS?
The United States, after being caught off guard, has indicated that it
is ready to invest in the Middle East. In a speech at Columbia
University, Secretary of State Warren Christopher unveiled the U.S.'s
156. FAA of 1969, supra note 26.
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tentative aid proposal: about $250 million for the West Bank and Gaza
Strip over two years. 57 Approximately 60% ($150 million) of this aid
would be disbursed in "technical assistance" direct grants, which would
come from existing foreign aid appropriations, while the remaining 40%
($100 million) would be in the form of OPIC loans and loan guarantees
to spur private investment' 58 (the latter being similar to the suggestions
of this article, though limited to spur Palestinian growth and not engi-
neered to promote Arab-Israeli or Israeli-Palestinian cooperation). In
addition, President Clinton organized a forty-three nation Donor Confer-
ence on October 1, 1993, at which donor nations promised approximate-
ly $2 billion in aid to the Palestinians over the next five years. 159 Of the
$2 billion, $600 million in aid was slated for the first year.
The United States pledged $500 million over the next five years
(including the $250 million during the first two years);' 6° Saudi Arabia
committed to assist with $100 million over the first year and left the
door open for future contributions;' 6' Israel pledged $75 million in
aid; 162 the European Union pledged $600 million over five years; 163 and
Japan pledged $200 million over the next two years. 64 The Nordic
countries pledged $150 million over an unspecified period. 65 Separately,
the U.N. Development Program decided to earmark $30 to $40 million
for the territories in 1994, more than doubling its allotment for the
previous year.' 66 This money is significant because it is apparently the
only aid that may be immediately forthcoming. 167
However, the U.S. package barely aims at keeping up with the
immediate necessities of the region. It is far from a visionary package.
A more ambitious plan could ensure that the United States turns this
crisis of need into an opportunity for shaping the future of the region.
157. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. To Contribute $250 Million in Aid for Palestinians, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1993, at Al.
158. Id.; A Financial Commitment to Support Peace, NEAR E. REP., Oct. I1, 1993, at
179.
159. Steven Greenhouse, 43 Nations Promise Palestinians $2 Billion in Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1993, at A2.
160. Id.; see also Sciolino, supra note 157.
161. Greenhouse, supra note 159, at 2. Some have expressed doubts about the Saudis'
willingness, or even capacity, to deliver. See Kiss Now, Pay Later, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 30,
1993, at 45.
162. Greenhouse, supra note 159, at 2.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Sue Fishkoff, UNDP Earmarks up to $40m. for Territories in 1994, JERUSALEM
POST, Dec. 17, 1993, at A3.
167. Id.
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The Clinton Administration could take advantage of the otherwise
ephemeral goodwill that has been generated in the Middle East - and
in Congress - to enhance not only the economic development of the
occupied territories, itself an important prerequisite, but also the pros-
pects for peace between Israelis and Palestinians and among Israel and
other Arab countries. At the same time, the United States could nurture
its own strategic and economic interests.
The tentative U.S. proposal suffers from deficiencies in magnitude,
scope, and structure. In terms of magnitude, $125 million over the
course of the next year seems shortsighted and inadequate to help the
Palestinians. The combined GDP for Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza
was over $62.3 billion in 1991.168 The U.S. aid package constitutes
about one five-hundredth of that figure. Although the combined GDP
for Gaza and the West Bank alone was only about $2.3 billion between
1990 and 1991,'69 the size of these economies only highlights the dire
needs of its 1.8 million inhabitants. According to estimates by the
Palestine Development Programme, based on a study by the PLO's
Department of Economic Affairs and Planning, $11.6 billion over the
next seven years will be necessary. 70 The stakes are far too great to
limit aid to a token that will allay moral pangs among the U.S. public.
A real dent in the stagnating economies of Gaza and the West Bank
must be made to fend off radical and extremist forces that feed off of
poverty and desperation.17
In terms of scope, the U.S. proposal would better serve the region
(and the United States) if - in addition to aid to the Palestinians - a
program were designed to foster the economic development and cooper-
ation of all countries involved in the peace process. The ideal program
should encourage economic interaction among Israel and all of its Arab
neighbors, or even among Israel and all interested Arab nations.
Limiting aid to the development of the occupied territories creates
friction and political jealousy in a region that already suffers from an
inordinate amount of dissension. Jordanians, for example, are worried
168. Israel's 1991 GDP was $59.1 billion. The West Bank's and Gaza's hovered around
$2.3 billion. See Let's Stay Together, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1993, at 66, citing IN-
STITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
SECURING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PROJECT ON ECONOMIC TRANSITION (1993).
169. Id.
170. Othylat Suliman, Investing in a Palestinian Future, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Cairo),
Sept. 30-Oct. 6, 1993, at 4; see also Your Place or Mine?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1993,
at 17.
171. See, e.g., John Kifner, Arabs Say Prompt Aid Is Crucial for Self-Rule, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1993, at A4; Steven Greenhouse, Palestinians Seen in Need of Billions in Foreign
Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1993, at A12.
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that Palestinians will exhaust international contributions to the region.
They are concerned about rising poverty and unemployment, burdened
with $4 billion in losses incurred during the 1990-91 Gulf War. 72 Jor-
danians would like foreign donors to aid in trimming down their ex-
ternal debt, estimated to be $6.5 billion.'73 While this pressure could
impel the Hashemite Kingdom to move toward peace, 174 it also may
have the undesirable effect of stymying private investments of Palestin-
ian businessmen living in Jordan..Many Palestinians residing in Jordan
are intimidated and hesitate to invest in the occupied territories because
they fear that the Jordanian government will question their loyalty.
75
Similar attitudes exist in Lebanon and Syria.
Israeli Arabs, too, are ambivalent about the Israeli-PLO agreement
and the promised foreign aid, because they feel that they are being
sidetracked. They argue that while the Jewish State and the world may
be warming up to the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza,
Israel's 800,000 Arab citizens are being neglected and their call for
equality and financial betterment is being ignored. 76 Alouph Hareven,
co-director of the Jerusalem-based Association for the Advancement of
Equal Opportunity, warns that a new paradox may develop: "As Israel's
external problems with its Arab neighbors are gradually being resolved
following the breakthrough agreement with the PLO, the internal predic-
ament of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel is likely to grow."'
' 77
Furthermore, confining foreign aid to the development of the oc-
cupied territories is dangerous and deficient. It is dangerous because the
risks of a successful peace are not diversified: if Israeli-Palestinian peace
efforts fail, negative reverberations will be uniformly and singularly
experienced and will substantially set back Arab-Israeli peace efforts.
The current aid structure is deficient because it fails to stimulate cooper-
ation among Arabs and Israelis. It is indisputable that developing the
economy of the occupied territories must be the first priority of peace
172. Jordanian Elections Unlikely to Shake Parliamentary Support for Peace Talks,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 8, 1993, at 2.
173. See id.
174. See, e.g., Wahid Abdel-Meguid, Jordan's Piece of the Peace Pie, AL-AHRAM
WKLY. (Cairo), Oct. 7-13, 1993, at 3 (asserting that Jordanian apprehensiveness about being
sidetracked led it to seek economic agreements with Israel).
175. Lahoud, supra note 128.
176. Steve Rodan, Israeli Arabs Want a Piece of the Action, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 26,
1993, at B3.
177. Alouph Hareven, Changing National Priorities: Can Israel Develop Its Civil
Society?, NEAR E. REP., Oct. 11, 1993, at 184.
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proponents. But in addition, the opportunity should be taken to cultivate
relations among former enemies: Israelis, Palestinians, and other Arabs.
Most important in terms of structure, the U.S. package could be
redesigned to increase its effectiveness and potency. Even if the U.S.
government were forced to ration its foreign aid because of budgetary
constraints, better ways of disbursing it could magnify its impact. Direct
grants for public projects - which constitute the lion's share of the
Administration's current proposal - are indeed necessary to jump-start
the economies of Gaza and the West Bank. Still, in addition to direct
grants, the United States should consider a multifaceted package of
incentives for joint ventures, which would be superior to direct grants in
many ways.
Disbursing direct grants to centralized entities could end in a quag-
mire. It may subject foreign aid to corruption, political domination and
misuse of funds, bureaucratic waste, incompetence, and delays in dis-
tribution. The PLO has set up the Palestine Economic Development and
Reconstruction Agency (PEDRA) to handle the international allotment
of aid.178 But many donor nations and independent Palestinians are dis-
turbed because Yasser Arafat appointed himself chairman of PEDRA
and made his deputy, Kadoumi, deputy chairman. 79 Many Palestinians
have raised questions about the ability of PLO bureaucrats to deal
competently with economic matters.8 Others have pointed to internal
fighting for control over new posts in the Palestinian administration'
and are concerned that some of the aid may be used to ensure Arafat's
political domination by buying political support.'82
The PLO has promised that the aid will be "spent honestly" and has
hired management consultants and auditors to assist it with the task.'83
Meanwhile, however, some of the most respected Palestinian economists,
178. David Makovsky, Christopher Tells Arafat He Won't Intervene, JERUSALEM POST,
Dec. 7, 1993, at 1.
179. PLO Promises Honesty with Aid Money, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 21, 1993, at 12;
see also Edward Said, The Morning After, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Cairo), Oct. 7-13, 1993, at 7;
Jon Immanuel, Negotiations on Self-Rule to Resume in Cairo Tomorrow, PLO Reports,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 14, 1993, at 1.
180. Barry James, Muddle Stalls Palestinian Central Bank, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov.
17, 1993, at 2 (citing senior Palestinian banker in Europe as questioning PLO officials'
"experience of civil life"); Said, supra note 179; PLO Is Advertising for Economists, JERUSA-
LEM POST, Dec. 15, 1993, at 8.
181. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Arafat Picks Loyalists to Carry Out Peace Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1993, at A7.
182. Makovsky, supra note 178; Immanuel, supra note 179.
183. PLO Promises Honesty with Aid Money, supra note 179, at 12.
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like Professor Yosef Sayegh, author of the PLO's six-year economic plan,
resigned from PEDRA to protest Arafat's refusal to increase the authority
of technocrats concerning the use of aid.1
8 4
International donors are not convinced of PEDRA' s independence or
technical efficiency and have thus far forestalled the transfer of aid,
demanding that economists rather than politicians be in charge of the
money. 85 Donor countries have also established a liaison committee to
coordinate the disbursement of aid between their countries and recipient
organizations, with the World Bank implementing the committee's deci-
sion186 While the aid is tied up by bureaucratic obstacles, residents of the
occupied territories are the ones suffering.
This leads to the final, and most critical, structural deficiency of
government grants to other quasi-governmental organizations: the slow-
ness of the process, the lag in affecting the lives of the region's inhabit-
ants. Aid is urgently needed to show to the affected communities the
tangible benefits of coexistence. Governmental commitments to make aid
available to other government entities that will then provide the funds to
a liaison committee that will then disburse the aid to local organizations
are not sufficiently swift.
The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles was signed on
September 13, 1993, and the Donor Conference was held on October 1,
1993. Yet, by the end of 1993, well after the originally scheduled
December 13 deadline for Israeli troops to pull out of the territories, no
aid had been disbursed.'87 No responsible or accountable entity had been
found or created to administer all of the aid. PLO officials in the territo-
ries did not even have the necessary funds or approval to begin readying
the PLO administrative headquarters, 88 let alone to develop the area's
infrastructure. And, as of December 20, 1993, no substantial progress in
disbursing this vital aid had been made. Palestinians in both Gaza and
Jericho are increasingly expressing uncertainty and despair about their
economic future. Experts fear that, owing to the lack of information,
infrastructure, and organization, aid will not be absorbed, or even
disbursed, in time to make a difference.189 Meanwhile, local businesses
184. Jon Immanuel, The Battle for Palestinian Democracy Begins, JERUSALEM POST, Dec.
10, 1993, at B3.
185. James, supra note 180; Lamia Lahoud, Palestinians Want Donors to Release Funds,
JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 17, 1993, at A12.
186. Jose Rosenfeld, Liaison Body Set Up to Oversee Palestinian Aid, JERUSALEM POST,
Nov. 8, 1993, at 8.
187. Jon Immanuel, Gaza: Self-Rule Doesn't Mean Self-Sufficiency, JERUSALEM POST, Dec.
10, 1993, at BI.
188. Abraham Rabinovich, Jericho Waking Up to Autonomy, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 10,
1993, at BI.
189. An official at the World Bank expressed concern that "the constraint is not money
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are eagerly awaiting projects and prospective foreign investors, and
potential investors are holding back to see if their investments will be
safeguarded."°
Incentives to enter into joint ventures are an ideal means of promot-
ing economic development and peace. Incentives skip the corruption and
bureaucracy with which centralized public funding would probably be
riddled. Incentives foster the participation of private investors, thus
avoiding middlemen. Investors, guided by market forces, add their own
expertise, tools, and capital to the economy, magnifying the effect of
foreign aid.
The Clinton Administration still has time to improve its aid package
and to come up with a more efficient and effective program for economic
development. For example, tax provisions could be passed by Congress
that would immediately create an incentive for the private sector to
invest. It is not far-fetched to expect that the Administration will
ultimately come up with a package that encourages the private sector to
leverage the government's investment in the stability and prosperity of
the Middle East. A recently unveiled high technology cooperation
program between the United States and Israel' 9' may be a sign that
economic cooperation programs appeal to President Clinton, who may see
in them an effective means of achieving U.S. objectives with relatively
small capitalization requirements. 92 Indeed, Vice President Gore said
during the Donor Conference that Palestinians would ultimately have to
rely on private investors, not foreign aid, to attain long-term prosperity.' 93
but how much money can be spent productively. The international experience is that even 10
percent of GNP is difficult to [manage and absorb]." Othylat Suliman, Investing in a Palestin-
ian Future, AL-AHRAM WKLY. (Cairo), Sept. 30-Oct. 6, 1993, at 4 (quoting World Bank
official). The Egyptian economy in the early 1980s was only able to absorb approximately 60%
of U.S. aid for similar reasons.
190. See, e.g., Arabs Set Up Company to Invest in Territories, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 19,
1993, at A6; Amira Howeidi, Palestinian Businessmen Tread Cautiously, AL-AHRAM WKLY.
(Cairo), Sept. 30-Oct. 6, 1993, at 2.
191. Nathan Kempster, Clinton Refurbishes Ties to Israel, Assures of Security Backing,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1993, at A4.
192. Comments by a former member of President Clinton's team are hopefully still
indicative of the Administration's philosophy:
Given the obvious financial constraints, we will need to take much greater care in
assuring that the resources we dedicate to advance our important interests abroad are
expended in a coordinated and effective manner .... We must ensure that our aid
activities directly support democracy, free markets, and sustainable development.
This will receive my highest priority.
Testimony by Deputy Secretary of State-designate Clifton Wharton: Confirmation Hearings
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), cited in 1
AIPAC, CONGRESSIONAL REPORT 3 (Jan. 1993).
193. See Greenhouse, supra note 159, at 2.
[Vol. 15:405
Winter 1994] U.S. Investment in Arab-Israeli Joint Ventures
V. THE POLITICAL CLIMATE: WHEN
SHOULD PASSAGE BE URGED?
In assessing whether passage of a U.S. statute to encourage invest-
ment in the Middle East should presently be urged, two factors must be
considered: the current domestic sentiment toward this type of legislation,
and the present state of affairs in the Middle East peace process.
Until recently, the mood in the United States was such that prospects
of passage seemed minimal at best. Foreign assistance programs and
foreign involvement were unpopular. A growing number of U.S. citizens
believe that the United States should stop funneling money abroad and
start concentrating on domestic affairs. A feeling exists among many that
domestic issues must now take priority over foreign aid. Some in this
camp may even believe that more than enough cooperation programs
exist at present that achieve the desired goal of bringing Arabs and
Israelis together.
Budget woes and record federal deficits have alerted the country to
the need to cut programs. The atmosphere on Capitol Hill is such that it
will be difficult to keep the foreign aid budget at its present level, let
alone increase it. Indeed, in the last presidential elections, now-President
Clinton criticized the Bush Administration for encouraging U.S. com-
panies to relocate in foreign countries. The tax code, it has been con-
tended, promotes foreign investment because the government forgoes
taxes on foreign income until it is distributed to U.S. shareholders, thus
encouraging "reinvestment of profits rather than rapid remittance."' 94 In
the past, amendments to foreign aid laws have been passed to ensure that
assistance to other countries does not hurt U.S. jobs. For example, in
1978 a provision was added prohibiting OPIC from insuring projects
likely to cause significant reductions in the number of employees in the
United States. 95 Such a provision could be included in the proposals
advanced in this article.
On the other side stand unprecedented international needs and
opportunities. The Mideast peace talks are at a critical juncture. Never
before have all the parties been so close to a comprehensive peace
194. Shaffer, supra note 75, at 212. See generally Robert Frank & Richard Freeman, The
Domestic Employment Costs of U.S. Investment in Developing Countries, in UNITED STATES
TAXATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 79, at 1-27 (arguing that U.S. tax
treatment does not clearly encourage more flight of multinationals than would occur anyway,
but that its deferral mechanism amounts to an indirect subsidy for Less Developed Countries,
whose governments end up taxing amounts that go untaxed by the United States).
195. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
268, 92 Stat. 213 (1978).
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agreement. The Israeli-PLO autonomy agreement will be the litmus test
to determine whether Israelis and Arabs continue on the arduous road of
rapprochement that was first taken two years ago. Over the past two
years, for the first time in history, Israelis have sat across the same table
from their Arab neighbors to discuss peace; 96 for the first time in history,
King Fahd held talks with a group of U.S. Jewish leaders in Saudi
Arabia, a country which previously prohibited Jews from even entering
the land; 97 for the first time ever, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt held
talks with a delegation of U.S. Jews and said that "the groundwork was
laid for possible Egyptian investment in Israel;"'198 for the first time ever,
the PLO recognized Israel's right to exist, and Israel recognized the PLO
as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.' 99
After years of debate, Palestinians and Israelis finally agreed on a
plan that grants autonomy to the Palestinians and enters upon the road
toward a final settlement between them within the next five years.
200
Significantly, Israel and the PLO have agreed to keep their markets open
during the transitional period.20' In anticipation of potential peace, Israeli
and Palestinian agencies and entities are entering into unprecedented
dialogues and agreements. 2°2
Meanwhile, Jordan, anxious not to be left out, is swiftly progressing
toward integration on the political and economic tracks.2 3 Shortly after
the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles, Jordan
signed an agreement setting the bases for negotiations with Israel.2' This
was followed by a meeting in the Oval Office among President Clinton,
Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan, and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon
Peres, the first such high-level public gathering.2 5 In less than one month,
much-heralded economic cooperation "understandings" had been reached
196. See supra text accompanying notes 1-14.
197. Jews and Saudis Hold First Talks in Saudi Arabia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1992, at A3.
198. Cynthia Mann, Jewish Leaders Hold First-Ever Meeting with Mubarak, JEWISH
BULL., Mar. 5, 1993, at 36.
199. See Haberman, supra note 1.
200. Thomas L. Friedman, Dividing a Homeland, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1993, at Al, A17.
201. David Makovsky, Peres: Israel, PLO Agree on Open Market, JERUSALEM POST, Dec.
17, 1993, at Al.
202. See, e.g., Michal Yudelman, Histadrut Palestinian Trade Unions Sign Pact,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 7, 1993, at 1.
203. See, e.g., Abdel-Meguid, supra note 174, at 3 (asserting that Jordanian apprehen-
siveness about being sidetracked led it to seek economic agreements with Israel).
204. See Sciolino, supra note 4; see also Jordan Takes Big Step Toward Peace, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Oct. 30, 1992, at A4.
205. Thomas L. Friedman, There's No Disguising It This Time as Israel and Jordan Meet
in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1993, at 1.
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by Jordan's King Hussein and Foreign Minister Peres. 206 As a direct
result, Jordanian banks were allowed to open branches in the occupied
territories. 2 7 Most significantly, when elections perceived as a referendum
on the peace process took place, Jordanian voters embraced the King's
aperture to Israel and turned down the Islamic fundamentalist opposi-
tion. 20
8
Syria, despite its discomfort with the Israeli-Palestinian agreement,
has grudgingly indicated to President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt that it
continues to be committed to "a peace of the brave" with Israel.2°9
Moreover, on the eve of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's
visit to Damascus, Syrian President Hafez Assad promised to allow the
remaining Jews living in Syria to emigrate to Israel and said that he
would attempt to gather information on Israeli soldiers missing in action.
In return, Christopher announced that President Clinton would meet
Assad in January 1994.21°
All of these developments contrast starkly with what seemed, just
months ago, to be an irreversible trend toward separation. It was only
April of 1993 when Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, amid rising
violence, sealed off the West Bank and Gaza Strip and indicated that his
cabinet would begin plans to reduce permanently the number of
Palestinians who would be allowed to work in Israel proper.2'1 Now that
there has finally been a breakthrough, the United States and other
206. David Makovsky, Hussein, Peres Signed 'Understandings' in Amman Last Week,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 7, 1993, at 1.
207. Jose Rosenfeld, Deal Signed Allowing Jordanian Banks to Open Branches in Areas,
JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 7, 1993, at 8. Palestinians have raised some objections to the present
establishment of Jordanian banks in the territories. PLO Asks Jordan to Delay Reopening Banks
in Territories, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 20, 1993, at 8.
208. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Jordanian Voters Spurn the Radicals, INT'L HERALD TRiB.,
Nov. 10, 1993, at 1; see also P.V. Vivekanand, Parliament Welcomes Moves Toward Peace,
Tripartite Economic Working Group Meets Today in U.S., JORDAN TIMES, Nov. 30, 1993, at
1.
209. See William E. Schmidt, Syrian Leader Plays a Waiting Game, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1993, at A8; Chris Hedges, Mubarak Reports Syria Wants Peace with Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 1993, at Al, A8; see also David Makovsky, Syrian Statement Pleases Negotiators,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 24, 1992 (statement by Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sha'ara that
Syria is committed to finding "total peace").
210. Douglas Davis, New-Evidence Links Syria, Iran to Lockerbie Disaster, JERUSALEM
POST, Dec. 21, 1993, at 4; see also Batsheva Tsur, Rabin Hopes Assad Will Free Syrian Jews
as He Promised, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 29, 1993, at 14.
211. Clyde Haberman, Israel Starts Planning to Replace Its Arab Workers, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1993, at A6. Separating the West Bank from Israel seems geographically and econom-
ically impossible, at least in the short term, according to most studies and experts. Wages
derived by Palestinian workers in Israel account for one-third of the total revenues derived by
Palestinians in the West Bank. Id. On the other hand, Israelis have been unwilling to fill low-
paying jobs in agriculture and construction. Id.
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countries interested in attaining stability in the region must seize the
momentum precipitated by these historic events and spread the mist of
hope and optimism throughout the region before it evaporates. Creating
tangible incentives for peace could impel the hold-out countries - as
well as some of the rejectionist Israeli and Palestinian elements - to
move forward.
It must be emphasized, however, that the Israeli-Palestinian break-
through has not crystallized into the crown jewel of peace, and an
arduous process of experimentation will have to occur before the carbon
of hatred is transformed into a diamond of tolerance. Indeed, the peace
process is guaranteed to oscillate between optimism and disillusionment.
Peace supporters' most important task is to ensure that any swing is not
so extreme that it derails the process.
Already, many seemingly irreconcilable disagreements have been
registered and overcome. Unfortunately, however, discontent at the slow
progress on the road to independence has significantly eroded support for
the Palestinian-Israeli agreement among Palestinians: from 64.9% after
the signing of the agreement to 41.5% in mid-December.2t 2 In the first
elections since the accord was signed, Yasser Arafat's supporters were
ousted from control of the student council in Bir-Zeit University,
traditionally a stronghold of Arafat's Fatah party, by opponents of the
accord.1 3
All of the international aid promised has not materialized and does
not seem to be forthcoming. As of December 15, 1993, the only projects
about to be undertaken were those put together by the Israeli Civil
Administration.1 4 Economic despair, coupled with stagnation in the
negotiations for the implementation of the Interim Agreement, have
prompted even Fatah supporters to renounce the agreement.
215
There are two lessons to be learned from these developments. First,
the architects of peace must be patient and persevering in their efforts.
The fact that coexistence is proving to be so hard to achieve and to be
such a disillusionment to its anxious participants is evidence that more,
not less, must be done by those who cherish peace. Second, the patrons
of peace must pump more coal into the engine of peace. The soundness
212. Jon Immanuel, Palestinian Support for Accord Falls, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 17,
1993, at Al.
213. Lamia Lahoud, Hamas-DFLP-PFLP Oust Fatah from Control of Bir-Zeit University,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 25, 1993, at 14.
214. See, e.g., Jose Rosenfeld, Ministry Gives Morocco Green Light to Trade with Israel,
JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 15, 1993, at 9.
215. See, e.g., Gaza Fatah Hawks Renounce Truce, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 30, 1993, at
1. The Hawks later rejoined the truce.
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of a proposal like the present one to foster regional economic cooperation
expeditiously in order to attain stability does not rest on initial success in
Israeli-Palestinian relations, but rather on broader principles of human
nature and economic interaction. If peace path adherents are to cease
dwindling, it is essential to ameliorate the lives of those touched by the
process.
The provisions advanced in this article are helpful to the peace
process in three ways. First, they provide tangible economic rewards to
the peace-risk-takers: increased foreign investment and economic devel-
opment. These "peace dividends" in turn make inhabitants more support-
ive of the sweeping process. In other words, these provisions act as
buffers that protect against chronic shocks of disgruntlement with the
peace process. Second, the provisions help cement economic and political
relations, as explained in Part I: increased economic interaction engenders
vested interests in maintaining commercial relations. Third, and
particularly important in terms of timing, they demonstrate a commitment
by the United States to be a partner in the peace process and to
compensate valiant steps by defusing the risks taken.2 16 Signaling such
U.S. commitment and providing such incentives are important steps that
can prepare the populations in the Middle East for such change and
convince their leaders that it pays to cooperate. For the United States,
peace will bring many benefits too.
How are global and domestic factors to be reconciled? A proponent
of this legislation would emphasize that the U.S. economy will benefit in
the long-term, as foreign markets are opened up for U.S. companies. In
addition, to the extent the proposals succeed in stimulating investment by
U.S. companies that would otherwise not have taken place at all, the tax
revenues generated by such investments, even after taking account of tax
credits and disbursed federal guarantees, will represent a net gain in
federal revenues. Far more important, however, is the indirect effect of
these incentives in promoting peace and stability. It is in the interests of
the United States to invest a small amount in Middle East peace in order
to avoid substantial military outlays in the future, as was the case with
the Gulf War.217 Preventive measures are preferableto wars.
The proposed legislation, which would have been an unlikely can-
didate for deliberation during this or the next term of the legislature, is
now worthy of serious consideration because of the significant overtures
216. See Foreign Relations Committee Backs Waiver of Anti-PLO Laws, NEAR E. REP.,
Oct. 11, 1993, at 180 (citing letter to President Clinton by Representative Rob Andrews (D-NJ):
"As Israel has taken her 'risk for peace,' the U.S. must remain her most constant ally.").
217. That is perhaps why the president of the Overseas Development Council, John
Sewell, called for the placement of aid to Israel and Egypt in a separate "Middle East Peace
Account." ESTER KURZ, 2 AIPAC CONGRESSIONAL REPORT 2 (Feb. 1993).
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in the peace process that took place in September 1993 and the clear
needs of the region. These have changed the mood on Capitol Hill and
in the Administration. Whereas until recently there was constant pressure
to reduce the Middle East foreign aid budget, now the feeling in Congress
is that aid to the region must be increased to procure the fragile peace
among Israelis and Palestinians.2 8 It is no longer a question of whether
to help the region; rather, the question now centers on the means to do
it.
CONCLUSION
Possible skepticism about the effectiveness of these incentives is
likely to be encountered. Admittedly, at present, many countries that are
at war with Israel could not, and would not, participate in the efforts of
a Middle East investment agency or in joint ventures with Israelis and
Americans. Some are doubtful that these measures would have any effect
in bridging the gap between long-time enemies. If Arabs and Israelis have
been at odds during the past forty-five years over issues of life and death,
religion, land, and honor, the prospect of extra profits will not bring them
together. Moreover, joint ventures require a high degree of close coopera-
tion and a substantial unity of interest among partners ;219 it is risky to use
this investment vehicle when the partners are former enemies.220
But joint ventures between Arabs and Israelis already exist today,
even if in small numbers.22' Israeli newspapers have recently been
218. Kuttler, supra note 145, at BI.
219. Dobkin, supra note 54, at 10.03.
220. Those concerned for the security and safety of countries in the Middle East could also
object to this program on the grounds that encouraging joint ventures among Arabs and Israelis
could hamper the defense capabilities of the countries, make infiltrations easier, and make a
country dependent on a potential or current enemy. Concerns with infiltration of defense
industries and capabilities seem unwarranted, because areas that are thought to be sensitive by
either country could simply be treated as off-limits to these programs. Governments could pass
laws against cooperation or interaction in defense industries. Moreover, a process of self-
selection would essentially ensure that Israelis and Arabs would not divulge to each other
military secrets or even cooperate in these areas, except to the extent that, after careful delibera-
tion, leaders of the countries involved see it in their interests to cooperate. Consequently, the
risk of cooperation in sensitive areas would be negligible, and the potential effect of weakening
anti-spy mechanisms would be even more negligible. As to the concern regarding making
countries dependent on their enemies, it is true that countries would become interdependent and
to that extent could become subject to the whims of their neighbors. But this is the very
objective of the program. By creating mutual interdependence, countries would realize that it
is in their interests to cooperate and maintain good relations with their neighbors. Moreover,
governments could determine the areas in which self-sufficiency is imperative and designate
programs to ensure that these sectors are independently maintained.
221. See, e.g., Negocios con el Enemigo, EL PAls (Spain), Sept. 19, 1993, at 9 (disclosing
that Israeli and Arab businessmen have already been engaging in quiet cooperation and trade
projects).
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reporting with eagerness prospective alliances between Israeli and Arab
companies: an Israeli airline has signed contingent supply, flight, and
refueling agreements with agents in Amman, Beirut, and Damascus;222
Koor Industries, Israel's leading industrial concern, and the Ghussein
Group, led by the "Palestinians most important business leader," have
entered into a $60 million deal; 223 Saudi Arabian investors have purchased
a stake in an Israeli corporation;24 and Israeli banks have established
relationships with Palestinian banks in the territories. 25 From the opening
of a hospital in Gaza by Israelis and Palestinians 226 to smaller trade
transactions between Egyptians and Israelis,227 a few determined
businessmen have forged ahead.
Egypt, Jordan, and Palestinians living in the occupied territories
would be able to benefit immediately from the investment project. Most
important, one of the very objectives' of this program would be to "en-
tice" countries such as Tunisia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,
and Morocco, who have already hinted at improving relations with
Israel,22 into participation. Morocco, in particular, seems eager to get on
with the business of peace: it is negotiating to open airlinks with Israel,229
and two Moroccan banks have set up official correspondent relations with
Israeli banks.230
222. Arkia Makes Flight Plans for Peace, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 11, 1993, at 14.
223. Amy Dockser Marcus, Big Israeli Firm and Palestinians Go into Business, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 6, 1993, at A14. The venture includes two other partners: Banesto, a Spanish Invest-
ment Bank, and Omnimum Nord Africa, a Moroccan industrial concern. ld; see also Neal
Sandier, Koor's Peace, LINK MAG. (Israel), Jan. 1994, at 18, 21.
224. Galit Lipkis Beck, Saudi Arabian Investors Buy 5% oflstec, JERUSALEM POST, Nov.
11, 1993, at 9.
225. Galit Lipkis Beck, Leumi in Partnership to Set Up Bank in Areas, JERUSALEM POST,
Dec. 20, 1993, at 8; Jon Immanuel, Gaza Banks on Growing Economic Ties, JERUSALEM POST,
Nov. 26, 1993, at B2.
226. Judy Siegel, Herzliya Medical Center Opens Gaza Clinic with Arab Businessman,
JERUSALEM POsT, Dec. 21, 1993, at 12.
227. Frutarom Signs Deal with Egyptian Company, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 16, 1993, at
9 (Egyptian company and Israeli producer of fragrances and flavors sign million dollar pact);
Galit Lipkis Beck, Zoglowek Negotiating Deals in China, Egypt, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 20,
1993, at 8 (meat and poultry processor negotiating to establish factories). See generally Ibrahim
Fahr-Rali, The Complete List of Egyptian-Israeli Trade Opportunities, ROSE EL YOUSSEF
(Egypt), Nov. 15, 1993, at 22 (title translated from Arabic).
228. See generally Clyde Haberman, Pact with PLO is Expected to Open the Way for Ties
to Muslim Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1993, at A8.
229. Amir Rozenblit, Morocco Seeking Air Link with Israel, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 15,
1993, at 3.
230. See Galit Lipkis Beck, Leumi Sets Up Direct Correspondent Relations with Moroccan
Bank, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 4, 1993, at 9; Hapoalim Establishes Official Correspondence
Relationship with Morocco's Largest Bank, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 15, 1993, at 8.
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Many other countries, including Lebanon and Syria, have dire
economic needs and desperately want direct foreign investment.23' This
program could bring them to the realization that, besides long-term
harmony and peace, confidence-building measures would yield immediate
economic benefits sufficient to counteract at least some critics who do not
want a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Economic interaction would
shatter myths about former enemies as it educates participants about each
other's cultures and concerns, ultimately strengthening bonds among the
participants.
The concept of regional cooperation in the Middle East is not
untested. Cooperation already takes place in limited sectors, such as the
scientific and agricultural fields. Most notably, it encompasses Egypt and
Israel, who are now discussing linking their electricity grids.232 Recently,
however, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Morocco have quietly
233 Gvrmnexpressed their interest in specific scientific cooperation. Government
officials in Israel and Jordan, who have often pondered the potential for
regional cooperation if only peace would come, are now discussing
agricultural and health projects 234 and performing feasibility studies in the
areas of infrastructure, water, rail transportation, chemicals, and
tourism.2 3 5
But why wait for it? Why not push for broader Arab-Israeli coopera-
tion? This program is very ambitious, but its potential is extremely far-
reaching. It would be an effective way to bring Arabs and Israelis
together. Its positive potential is too great - and its negative potential
too small - to be ignored just because it might not be successful.
One must keep in mind that this is just a small program. No big dents
will be made, and peace will not be achieved overnight. At the same
231. See, e.g., Lebanon Launches Capital Markets Program, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 4,
1993, at 9 (Lebanon hopes to raise $30 billion in next 10-15 years); Abdel-Meguid, supra note
174, at 3 (arguing that Lebanon's independent 10-year plan could be in jeopardy if Beirut
ignores pressure to enter into deal with Israel).
232. Crdation par L'Egypte d'une Station pour la Gn6ration de l'Electricitg a Gaza et
Jiricho [Egypt's Creation of a Station for the Generation of Electricity in Gaza and Jericho],
LE JOURNAL D'EGYPTE, Nov. 17, 1993, at 2; Yigal Kotzer, Israeli, Egyptian Power Grids to
Be Linked, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 21, 1993, at 1; Joshua Shuman, IEC Workers Head to Egypt
to Discuss Linking Grids, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 30, 1993, at 2.
233. Cf. MERC FACT SHEET, supra note 148 ("Participants in the marine sciences project
are currently involved in quiet discussions in effort [sic] to involve other Middle Eastern
countries in regional cooperation."); Waxman, supra note 149 ("Several moderate Arab states
expressed interest in joining the regional cooperation program quietly and unofficially.").
234. Lisa Palmieri-Billig, Tsur Talks Agriculture with Morocco, Jordan, JERUSALEM POST,
Nov. 11, 1993, at 2.
235. David Makovsky, Jordan Looking for Best Price in Middle East Peace Bazaar,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 14, 1993, at 12.
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time, these provisions would create an added reason for peace today, an
added incentive to take small confidence-building measures. No
substantial outlay of federal money would result, and the risks would be
minimal. Most important, passage of these provisions would constitute a
strong symbol of U.S. commitment to the peace process. The results of
passage could produce ripple effects for several players that would benefit
from this program. An army of peace would be created from the core of
beneficiaries whose sole mandate would be to uphold and safeguard
peaceful interaction.

